



Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi

The Journal of International Social Research

Cilt: 10 Sayı: 50 Volume: 10 Issue: 50

Haziran 2017 June 2017

www.sosyalarastirmalar.com Issn: 1307-9581

DAESH, THE PROLIFERATION OF VIOLENT “NON-STATE ACTORS” AND THE FUTURE OF THE MODERN NATION-STATE*

Idlir LIKA**

Abstract

A major question of our days is the proliferation of violent “non-state actors” such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (DAESH), Boko Haram and PYD in northern Syria. These developments confront the scholarly community with a basic question: why are these violent “non-state actors” emerging and how will they affect the nature and future of the modern nation-state, which is the building block of the modern international system since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia? This paper tries to tackle these questions by focusing exclusively on DAESH as the quintessential model of violent “non-state actors” and comparing it with the distinguishing features of the modern nation-state from other forms of governance and the competing theories regarding the emergence of the modern nation-state.

This paper suggests that violent “non-state actors” like DAESH are proliferating precisely because they have taken over many of modern state’s defining attributes. It concludes by pointing out that DAESH as such has challenged the modern nation-state in terms of *empirical* statehood but not *juridical* statehood.

Keywords: DAESH, Modern Nation State, Non-state Actors, Territoriality, Sovereignty, Empirical Statehood, Juridical Statehood.

1. Introduction

How can we explain the proliferation of violent “non-state actors” in our days? Why are these non-state actors emerging? How will they affect the nature and future of the modern nation-state? The times we are living through seem ripe enough for some preliminary thoughts on these questions.

Every excursus on the *state* must begin by its definition. It seems to me more useful to begin with a rather loose definition of the state and Charles Tilly provides such a definition. To him, states are “coercion-wielding organizations ... (which) exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories.” (Tilly, 1990: 1) Three distinctive features stand out in this definition. First, a state is an organization which claims a certain priority in the right to use force. This brings us to Weber’s classic definition of the state which very much emphasizes this aspect of the state, yet qualifies it, “A state is that human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a given territory.” (Weber, 2006: 84) Thus, force is intrinsic to any definition of state but it is monopolized and entails legitimacy. Second, states are organizations that claim authority to rule over a certain territory. In other words, their rule must be territorial-based, though, the limits of this territory change from one type of state to another. Third, the state is only one organization among many which try to impose rule over a certain territory. This means the state is not alone in its quest for legitimate authority. This loose definition, in turn, makes many types of organizations fit the category of state. In this respect, modern nation-states, empires, city-states, city-leagues, theocracies, shogunates and so on, all fit the loose description Tilly provides us with.

More recently, though, the proliferation of a group of violent “non-state actors” in global politics seems to add another unit to the aforementioned state category. I say so because violent actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereafter DAESH¹), Boko Haram operating in Nigeria, Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria to name but just a few, evidently qualify as a state in Tilly’s and even Weber’s conceptualizations.² They have captured a chunk of territory, thus their rule is territorial-based. Within that

* The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) for the research underpinning this article. The usual disclaimer applies.

** PhD Candidate, Koç University Department of International Relations and Political Science, ilika15@ku.edu.tr

¹ In this article, I opt for the original Arabic acronym of the group (formed from the initial letters of “ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fil Iraq wa al-Sham”, although more precisely it should be rendered as Da’ish), despite the fact that the term ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) is more widespread in scholarly and policy-making circles. I am of the conviction that we must stay loyal to the groups’ acronyms in original. For instance, no one, as far as this author is concerned, ever referred to PKK with its English acronym KWP (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) or its Turkish acronym KİP (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi). Everyone uses PKK. The same standard, I argue, should also apply for other groups such as DAESH presently.

² Actually, it is not only Tilly and Weber. Most of the comparativists subscribe to the aforementioned loose definition of state. I identify Tilly and Weber only as practical examples for this excursus on the state.

territory, they hold the monopoly of the use of force and they have outperformed many other organizations similarly competing for authority. In DAESH case, within the territories it controls in Iraq and Syria, it has outperformed no less than the Iraqi and Syrian state. Said that, while DAESH would qualify as a state in this loose sense, how does it fare in relation with the modern nation-state?

It has to be pointed out that the modern nation-state as a form of political organization differs from the pre-modern ones³ in some key defining features. It is a main contention of this paper that the modern nation-state is the predominant form of political organization globally since at least the seventeenth century, in other words it displaced all other forms of pre-modern governance, precisely because of these key features. It is another main contention of this paper that these violent “non-state actors” are emerging and proliferating precisely because they have taken over many of modern nation-state’s defining features. In what follows, this paper, by focusing exclusively on DAESH as the quintessential form of violent “non-state actors”, first outlines modern nation-state’s defining characteristics and analyses how well DAESH fares against these characteristics. Second, it broadens discussion’s scope by going through the major theories in academic literature regarding the emergence of the modern nation-state and considers their implications for the emergence in turn of violent “non-state actors”, herein epitomized by DAESH. The paper concludes by reflecting over how such actors might influence the nature and future of the modern nation-state.

2. Modern nation-state’s defining features and DAESH in comparative perspective

Among modern nation-state’s defining features, first, the modern nation-state claims legitimate authority to rule over permanent, clearly defined, demarcated territorial boundaries. *Clearly demarcated territoriality* is what sets apart the modern nation-state from pre-modern modes of governance. Pre-modern forms of political organization either did not have such clearly defined borders or their potential territorial area was the entire world, as empires have most prominently claimed. (Ruggie, 1993) Spruyt (2007: 212) posits that “modern state authority is defined uniquely as territorial rule with fixed geographic boundaries.” Pertaining to DAESH, it seems that in this respect it resembles more pre-modern state formations than the modern state. Although it can be claimed that DAESH has territorial boundaries, they are anything but fixed and constant. They are frequently subject to change due to the organizations incessant military operations. Modern state’s territorial boundaries, in contrast, are fixed and permanent.

Second, the modern nation-state replaced all other forms of ethnic, religious, local allegiances with a single basis for identification, that of the nation-state itself. This attribute is in itself unprecedented among other types of political organization as the modern nation-state put itself as the sole authority laying claim to its subjects’ *unconditional* obedience and allegiance.⁴ (Bull, 1977) Indeed, as Alessandro Pizzorno succinctly put it, “In fact state assumed many of the ideological roles claimed by institutionalized religion.” (Pizzorno, 1987 in Spruyt, 2007: 217) Judged from this attribute of the modern state, I contend that DAESH is very similar. Indeed, I can assert that the main pillar on which it claims to rule over its territories is the Islamic allegiance. The self-proclaimed reason behind its existence is to eradicate every kind of national and secular identification and replace it with Islamic identification. Nationalism and secularism, which undoubtedly are the building blocs of the modern nation-state, are the main enemies according to DAESH and are Islamically defined to be heresy. It would be quite easy indeed to prove that DAESH has succeeded in this mission. The fighters joining it from all over the world openly proclaim their total disassociation from the national states they legally belong to and swear allegiance to DAESH. In this way, we can better understand the significance of Pizzorno’s aforementioned claim. To conclude this section, I contend that DAESH success within its territory in displacing all other forms of national and secular allegiances and in making Islam as the sole basis for identification is a major cause explaining why it emerged. Evidently enough, DAESH has taken over one of modern state’s defining attributes.

Third, what sets apart modern nation-state is its immense capability for interference into the economic, social and political life. (Spruyt, 1994) The social dimension takes special importance in this respect because as the state demands its subjects’ unconditional allegiance, it will inevitably seek to impose its own rules and codes of conduct over the population. In other words, the state will try to socially control its subjects and this in turn will largely determine its strength. Joel Migdal nicely elaborates on this issue. For Migdal (1988: 22) social control is “the successful subordination of people’s own inclinations of social behavior in favor of the behavior prescribed by state rules.” This then raises the question of why state-imposed social behavior is accorded such primary importance. The reason is that the concept of ruling itself should be approached cautiously. Ruling necessitates obedience in every aspect of one’s domain of

³ By pre-modern states, I refer to the earlier and traditional state formations; empires, city-states, city-leagues and so on.

⁴ This attribute of the modern nation-state is unprecedented seen from the viewpoint of the academic scholarship, predominantly Western, on modern nation-state which is also the focus of this article. Clearly, long before the modern nation-state, Islamic Caliphates as a distinct form of political organization have displayed this attribute, making Islam the sole basis for its subjects’ unconditional allegiance. This point, though, is largely unacknowledged in the academic scholarship on modern nation-state.

authority. Disobedience in any realm would unsettle the legitimacy framework of the ruler/ruling institution. In this line James Scott (1998: 183) quotes Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, nineteenth century French philosopher and one of the founders of the theory of anarchism, claiming that "To be ruled is to be kept an eye on, inspected, spied on, regulated, indoctrinated, sermonized, listed and checked off, estimated, appraised, censured, ordered about ... To be ruled is at every operation, transaction, movement, to be noted, registered, counted, priced, admonished, prevented, reformed, redressed, corrected." This complete control is for Scott (1998: 183) "the great achievement of modern statecraft."

In this respect also, I can assert that DAESH has succeeded in taking over this main defining characteristic of the modern state. To understand this fact, it would suffice to have a look at the way they preach Islam in the territories they rule. Islam is not preached in only a ritualistic manner, meaning that all Islam is about is praying, fasting, doing pilgrimage and so on. Islam is preached as a way of life, it is explained in terms of dispositions that govern every realm of life. Islam has its own rules and codes of conduct for the political, social, economic and even private life realms. DAESH has succeeded in enforcing these rules on the territories it wields authority, although it has enforced some of these rules in accordance with its interpretation and understanding of religion.⁵ In Migdal's conceptualization, people's own inclinations have been subjected to Islamic rules and codes of conduct. Thus, again in Migdal's (1988) terms, DAESH *socially controls* its territories. What still captures my attention from Migdal's analysis is his claim that, "At the heart of the modern state's successes and failures, especially its ability to gain obedience, is the nature of its relationship to those it claims to rule." (Migdal, 1997: 211) I replicate the analysis and assert that at the heart of DAESH relative successes and relative strength is its ability to impose obedience over its subjects and set codes of conduct in various aspects of their lives.

Fourth, the modern nation-state is unprecedented not only in its degree of intrusion into the social and political life, but also in succeeding to "create a uniformity or universality to life within its borders." (Migdal, 1997: 209) Sometimes this is done through coercion, sometimes through consent and sometimes combining both of them. In an earlier work, Migdal had captured this point while arguing that "The difference in the modern period has been how state officials have acted to impose one set of rules over so large a territory and how this goal has spanned the globe." (Migdal, 1988: 16) DAESH largely has succeeded also in this respect and the various dimensions of this issue were discussed in the previous section, so I won't go through them once more. Suffice to say that DAESH has created a uniformity of life within its territories combining both coercion and consent. Consent should not be surprising here considering the great numbers of foreign fighters willingly joining it.

The fifth distinctive characteristic which sets apart the modern nation-state is "its immense capacity to mobilize and tap into societal resources." (Spruyt, 2007: 211) This is essentially related with modern state's capacity to extract taxes and most importantly its ability to centralize this process of resource extraction. (Karaman and Pamuk, 2013) State's increasing fiscal capacity in turn has afforded it enough opportunities to successfully wage war and displace all other contenders for power over its alleged territory. DAESH actually can not be said to possess an immense capacity to tap into societal resources but quite a considerable one. Owing to its nature of ruling, it extracts resources based on the religious affiliation of its subjects. The *jizya* tax taken from the non-Muslims and the alms-giving of the Muslims constitute two financial sources, yet not the main ones. War booties and oil constitute the two main financial sources. Yet, what is striking about DAESH is its capacity to centralize its fiscal administration. All decisions are taken from the Caliph and his *shura*, consultative council. This fact also makes DAESH take on another defining modern state feature.

Up until now, I have been arguing that DAESH and other violent non-state actors by extension are emerging because they have taken over many of modern state's defining attributes. This is important because I also contended that modern state displaced other pre-modern state formations owing to these defining attributes. How can we now put this discussion in context of the main competing theories regarding the emergence of the modern nation-state? I will briefly go through these main theories but let me clearly put my argument at the outset. In light of the competing theories, I contend that DAESH emerged because of a combination of war and ideology, explanatory factors that coincide with the modern state's defining attributes it has taken over.

3. Modern nation-state's emergence: competing explanations

Hendrik Spruyt (2007) summarizes the three main factors behind modern nation-state's emergence as war, trade and ideology. Concerning the first, it is a theme which has dominated academic research on state formation both in Comparative Politics and International Political Economy (IPE). Among comparative political scientists, Charles Tilly's (1975: 42) famous dictum can be recalled, "war made the state, and the

⁵ It is indeed precisely DAESH's *understanding* of religion in enforcing certain Islamic rules that has led to its widespread condemnation by the Muslim world. Otherwise, no one in the Muslim world disputes the fact that Islam is not only about rituals. It is a complete way of life, containing dispositions that govern every realm of life, even the most private ones.

state made war," while Robert Gilpin (1987: 85) among prominent realist IPE scholars has famously remarked that "The modern nation-state is first and foremost a war-making machine." Spruyt (2007: 214) maintains that changes in the way warfare was conducted and the introduction of new military technologies in late fifteenth century entailed a centralized administration and the building of strong extractive capacities in order to finance the increasing war exigencies. Centralization and fiscal capabilities, as aforementioned, are two distinctive attributes of the modern nation-state. In brief, "War wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of the states within it." (Tilly, 1990: 76)

Concerning DAESH, I assert that war is one of the causes that led to its emergence. Needless to say, DAESH is a war-making machine, yet the nature of war that led to its emergence is quite different from the one that led to the modern state's emergence. In the case of the modern nation-state, it were the war exigencies that pointed out to rulers the need for centralization in order to assemble more manpower and financial resources. In other words, the modern state as a distinct form of political organization afforded rulers many opportunities to successfully wage war. (Young, 1994; Spruyt, 1994) That is why in war-making conditions, it was much more feasible to be organized around a political formation like the modern state. Yet, in DAESH case it was, self-expressedly, the obligation to wage war against those that fight and oppose the spreading of Islam that led to its emergence. Openly, DAESH mission is to wage *jihad* and war is the basis of its existence. In other words, war is a main cause leading to its emergence.

Second, ideology is seen as a main generative cause to modern state's emergence. According to Spruyt (2007: 217), the key explanatory variable in this respect is a "dramatic shift in collective beliefs." It can be asserted that this dramatic shift started with the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, one crucial outcome of which was the *secularization* of the sources of political power. The people now wanted the art of ruling to be structured around political organizations built on rationality, not any more on religious principles. (Bromley, 1994) The modern nation-state emerged as the embodiment of the new secular, rational political authority and the masses started to identify with it. Spruyt (2007: 218) explicates this ideological shift, "An examination of ideological shifts clarifies the conditions under which humans came to understand themselves as atomistic individuals and their perceptions of right political order changed- an order which could emerge by rational design rather than religious mandate." It is striking to note that DAESH represents the complete reversal of the process discussed by Spruyt. It has emerged as the expression of religious authority and of the fact that political organizations are to be structured and based around religious principles. The ideology DAESH came with calls for a complete eradication of all collective identifications that conflict with Islamic principles. In brief, the firm conviction that Islam is and should be the sole basis for people's unconditional allegiance, combined with the obligation to practically implement this ideology is what led to DAESH emergence.

A third cause is trade but as it is not much related for our purposes here, I left it to be discussed last. Briefly, Spruyt (1994) emphasizes economic change and the rise of trade. There are two scholarly accounts that make economic changes and trade their main focus when explaining the emergence of the modern state: neo-marxists and neo-institutionalists. According to the former, the economic changes that happened after the end of feudal era, urbanization and the rise of trade led to the formation of a new social class, the bourgeoisie, which pushed for a new economic mode of production, capitalism. (Anderson, 1974; Jessop, 2003) Accordingly, neo-marxists then claim that "The advent of early capitalism thus dovetailed and necessitated the growth of a state apparatus." (Spruyt, 2007: 216) The modern state is supposed to act as an agent of the new founded social class, bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the neo-institutionalists view the emergence of the modern state in terms of a contract between an emerging mercantilist class profiting from the expansion of trade and ruling authorities in need of financial resources to finance their military expeditions. (North and Thomas, 1973) Furthermore, Spruyt (2007: 217) emphasizes that "mercantile groups for trade interests needed standardization of weights, measures and coinage; clearer definition of property rights; written legal codes." All these steps could be undertaken only in the presence of a centralized authority and bureaucracy, two other distinct features of the modern states. This contractarian view of state formation becomes the basis of a recent scholarly work on state formation. Wimmer (2013) develops the "domestic political alliance formation model". According to him, state formation should be seen as an outcome of a "compact between state elites and the population that is built on consent and the mutually favorable exchange of resources." (Wimmer, 2007: 17) As far as DAESH is concerned, although oil trade constitutes one of its two main financial sources, it is hard to make the argument that the need to extract oil rents from Iraq oilfields is what led to its emergence. The preceding discussion of war and ideology factors should make this point abundantly clear.

Last but not least, DAESH emergence seems to contradict the assumptions of a major model explaining the modern state's emergence. The *sociological institutionalist* model in the literature develops a

systemic structural approach to explain modern state's emergence. In this respect it is similar to world-system theory and state-competition theory (Wallerstein, 1974) that view the nation-state as "the creature of world-wide systems of economic or political power, exchange and competition." (Meyer et al., 1997: 147) For both models, the systemic structure is material. Yet, Meyer et al. (1997) put forward a third model, the *sociological institutionalist model*, whereby the structure is considered to be cultural, normative. According to sociological institutionalists, this international structure is exclusively defined by Western norms/culture and it is global in its scope. Thus, we have to do with a Western global culture which generates states and determines their behavior. The global culture traces back its origins in the "distinctive culture of Western Christendom," (Meyer et al., 1997: 168) and it legitimated the modern nation-state as "the preferred form of sovereign, responsible actor." (Meyer et al., 1997: 158) DAESH emergence definitely shows that the structural, cultural constraints do not hold in its case. To the contrary, it shows the emergence of an entity whose existence is driven primarily by the desire to eradicate this Western global culture. In brief, DAESH is an "outcast" in the community of modern states generated by the Western global culture. Thus, one has to look at other structural causes to explain DAESH existence and I identified these causes to be war and ideology.

4. Conclusion

I chose to examine DAESH as the quintessential example of the violent non-state actors precisely because in my view it has taken over many of modern state's defining attributes. Accordingly, I argue that developments similar in dynamics to those of DAESH will largely affect the nature and future of the modern nation-state. For one thing, even if this fact is not frequently acknowledged in the scholarly circles and is even denied in policy-making ones, the modern nation-state is not any more *unmatched* pertaining to its intrinsic characteristics. It would be hard presently to sustain the claim that the modern state is the sole political organization in terms of creating a single basis of ideological identification, in terms of its immense capacity to regulate many aspects of its subjects' lives, in terms of its huge capabilities in creating uniformity among its population and in terms of centralizing its fiscal capacities. Although it seems hard to come to terms with, DAESH to a very good degree has succeeded in taking over all these key features which hitherto were considered to belong only to the modern nation state.

What is an equally important development in my eyes is that DAESH has also challenged another aspect of the modern nation-state. As stated above, starting from the Protestant Reformation, the modern nation-state has been seen as the embodiment of the principle of the secularization of the sources of political power. Yet, the DAESH example convincingly challenges this principle. What makes the issue more striking is the legitimacy it enjoys in the eyes of some of the subjects living in its territory. Images of fighters from all over the world willingly joining DAESH, denouncing their national and secular affiliations and proclaiming completely new basis for identification largely impacts our thinking on the modern nation-state.

DAESH, as argued here, constitutes the quintessential expression of violent "non-state" actors that have taken over many of modern nation-states defining attributes. Yet, the recent rise of other violent "non-state" actors constitutes an equally concerning challenge for the modern state. It is ironic that one such actor, the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD), is also the staunchest opponent of DAESH in Syria. By ruling a de facto autonomous region in Rojava, northern Syria, by forcefully creating a single basis of ideological identification blending together "socialism and ethnic Kurdish nationalism," by violently intimidating and interfering in the lives of its subjects, by forcefully trying to create uniformity among its ethnically diverse population "in what amounts to a policy of ethnic cleansing," and by centralizing every aspect of its rule in a "militarized one party regime," (Aktürk, 2016) PYD can also be deemed to have successfully taken over many of modern nation-states attributes, yet in a blatantly and undisputably violent form. Whereas one can find certain elements of consent and legitimacy in DAESH rule,⁶ such elements are lacking in PYD case. Yet, concerning our present purposes, PYD case is relevant since together with DAESH they constitute violent "non-state" actors that have significantly shaken the widely-accepted notion that the modern nation-state is unmatched pertaining to its intrinsic characteristics. What can be more of a challenge than the sheer fact that DAESH has named itself as a *state*. It is for this reason I argued that DAESH constitutes the quintessential expression of violent "non-state" actors that have taken over many of modern nation-states defining attributes.

To conclude, by using Jackson and Rosberg's (1982) conceptualizations, it is safe to argue that DAESH constitutes a *state* in the *empirical* sense. In DAESH we observe empirical statehood in terms of "a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including "all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction."" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 2) Yet, in DAESH we do not observe *juridical statehood* in the sense of being

⁶ As evidenced by the images of native and, especially and most importantly, *foreign* fighters willingly joining it.

internationally recognized as an equal member with full rights and obligations in the international society of states. (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 12) In this context and in the broader context of other violent “non-state” actors, I judge it would be appropriate to conclude this article by posing the question: Pertaining to the future of the modern nation-state, can we claim that it can protect its primacy only juridically, because empirically it has already lost it? After this essay, it might be tempting to answer in the affirmative.

REFERENCES

- AKTÜRK, Şener (2016). "The PKK and PYD's Kurdish Soviet Experiment in Syria and Turkey", *Daily Sabah Op-Ed*, January 27, 2016.
- ANDERSON, Perry (1974). *The Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London: Verso.
- BROMLEY, Simon (1994). *Rethinking Middle East Politics*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- BULL, Hedley (1977). *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- GILPIN, Robert (1987). *The Political Economy of International Relations*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- JACKSON, Robert and ROSBERG, Carl (1982). "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood", *World Politics*, Vol. 35(1), pp. 1-24.
- JESSOP, Bob (2003). *The Future of the Capitalist State*, New York: Polity.
- KARAMAN, Kivanç and PAMUK, Şevket (2013). "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 107(3), pp. 603-626.
- MIGDAL, Joel (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- _____ (1997). "Studying the State", in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman (eds), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- NORTH, Douglass and THOMAS, Robert (1973). *The Rise of the Western World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- RUGGIE, John (1993). "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", *International Organization*, Vol. 47(1), pp. 139-174.
- SCOTT, James (1998). *Seeing like a State*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- SPRUYT, Hendrik (1994). "Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order", *International Organization*, Vol. 48(4), pp. 527-557.
- _____ (2007). "War, Trade, and State Formation", in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes eds, *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- TILLY, Charles (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- _____ (1990). *Coercion, Capital and European States*, Cambridge: BlackWell.
- MEYER, John, BOLL, John, THOMAS, George and RAMIREZ, Francisco (1997). "World Society and the Nation-State", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.103(1), pp. 144-181.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1974). *The Modern World System*, Vol. 1 New York: Academic Press.
- YOUNG, Crawford (1994). *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- WEBER, Max (2006). "What is a State?", in Bernard E. Brown (ed.), *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth.
- WIMMER, Andreas (2013). *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.