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IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPSTAT IN POLICE ORGANIZATIONS: THE CASE OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT*

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Abstract

Compstat is a popular management model, which has been implemented by numerous police organizations in the USA over the last two decades. The central purpose of this study is to examine the implementation of Compstat in a large police organization (Newark Police Department) in the United States. Specifically, the principles and components of this model are analyzed in terms of their contribution to the management of this police organization and limitations in practice. Data were collected in this case study through in-depth interviews, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of the documents, and analyzed using grounded theory. This study revealed that this model certainly improved the management of this police organization. Compstat established a measure of performance, accountability and information sharing. While the contribution of Compstat was evident, there were certain points to be improved. This study shed light on these limitations and possible solutions for them. This model has a high potential to address some of the operational and managerial problems of the Turkish National Police. Future research should make a comparison of Turkey and USA in terms of their structure, culture, technological infrastructure, and policing approaches and provide a perspective for practitioners who are willing to adapt this kind of models.

Keywords: Planned Organizational Change, Public management, Compstat, Police Organizations, Accountability, Information Sharing.

Introduction

Society's rapidly changing conditions and needs, demographics, market demands, government regulations, pressures created by globalization, increasing competition and resource constraints, and technological developments coalesce to make change a critical issue for all types of organizations (Fairchild, 1989). In the case of public organizations, taxpayers and funding sources are progressively demanding higher levels of performance at lower costs, and these pressures also require organizational changes of various kinds (Tromp & Ruben, 2004). All of these factors as well as institutional and cultural pressures have led to more change attempts among both public and private organizations.

In this environment, all types of organizations have increased their efforts to identify new technologies, innovations and new management and performance models in order to address the many emerging challenges and opportunities they face (Zorn, Page & Cheney, 2000). In recent years, pressures for change have also been apparent in police organizations. Like any public organization, police agencies must also respond to external pressures and adjust their internal functioning in order to respond to changing circumstances.

The development and implementation of Compstat by the New York Police Department (NYPD) is a valuable and leading example of an organizational change initiative adapted for police organizations. Compstat has been defined as a "technique for bringing state-

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of-the-art management principles into a single program customized for police organizations" (Smith & Bratton, 2001: 1). Compstat emerged in 1994 in the NYPD as a new, complex, multifaceted system (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). It was initially developed as a means to collect timely and accurate data about daily crime patterns to initiate tactics and strategies, increase the flow of information and communication among precinct commanders and departments, and ultimately increase performance and accountability (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Over time, "the initiative has been transformed into a more comprehensive form in its structure and promises, claiming to instigate the changes needed in police organizations and boasting the ability to reduce crime by making police organizations more responsive to management's direction and performance indicators" (Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005: 189).

After the implementation of Compstat in the NYPD, the significant reduction of crime received considerable attention from scholars in criminal justice, management, business, organizational behavior, and communication. Despite the difficulties expressed by scholars in directly linking crime reduction to Compstat, New York City's crime rate clearly declined 76% from 1993 to 2009. In 2008, the city's violent crime rate declined by 4%, outpacing the national violent crime rate decline of 2.5% (Kelling & Sousa, 2001). According to the FBI's UCR's statistics for 2008, New York City has remained the safest large city in America over the last three years. A group of scholars studied the assumed link between Compstat and crime reduction (Kelling & Sousa, 2001). Another group of scholars focused on Compstat's management aspects, including accountability, performance measurement, motivation, empowerment, information sharing, and communication.

Purpose of the Study

This study specifically focuses on the management aspects of this model by examining the implementation of Compstat in a specific police organization called the Newark Police Department (NPD) in the U.S.A. It has been asserted in the literature that Compstat had certain impacts on the management of the NYPD. Although this change in management may be true for the NYPD, it is likely that implementing these kinds of models does not necessarily result in their intended benefits in all police or public organizations. Thus, there is a need to question the success or failure in each organization that implemented these types of initiatives without making assumptions as to their inherent success. As a result, an attempt will be made in this study to determine whether Compstat improved the management of an organization as intended. Specifically, the principles and components of Compstat model will be analyzed in terms of their contribution to the management of this police organization and limitations in practice. To examine this point, in addition to opinions expressed by organizational members in interviews, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of the documents will be used. This methodological perspective provides information how principles and components of this model put into practice and, thus, goes beyond a superficial analysis. As such, this study extends existing works on Compstat by presenting dynamic and contextual understanding of this model, presenting the perspectives of officers from different ranks and positions; and using alternative data sources. Based on this ground, the main research questions are:

- 1) *How was Compstat principles and components implemented in the selected study site?*
 - a) *What was the contribution of the Compstat principles and components to the management of the selected study site and limitations in practice?*

1. Compstat Model

1.1. Emergence and Definition of Compstat

The growing crime problem in large cities of the U.S.A. during the 1980s and early 1990s increased the amount of criticism on the effectiveness of policing styles and police organizations, especially in crime-ridden urban areas, and thus led to the increase of change expectations (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). New York City in the 1980s and 1990s was a leading example of this situation. After Rudolph Giuliani had been elected New York's governor in 1993, owing largely to his campaign on the issues of quality of life and crime, Giuliani selected

William Bratton as police chief of the NYPD due to his best known role in decreasing the crime rates in the subway system of New York City in previous years (Buntin, 1999).

When William Bratton took command of the NYPD, many researchers claimed that the situation in New York City was in chaos, and people were afraid of becoming victims of crimes (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). New Yorkers had a strong desire to be out of the danger and lawlessness they experienced every day that made living in the city so uncomfortable. The police department seemed demoralized, dysfunctional, and corrupt and the centralized, bureaucratic organizational structure appeared to promote red tape rather than facilitate effective use of resources (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). The main philosophy became “*stay low and avoid trouble*” (Maanen, 1975: 222) because the NYPD lacked a sense of the importance of its main crime control mission and was not setting goals or articulating a vision concerning what its officers could do and accomplish (Willis, Matrafski & Weisburd, 2007). It was suggested that there was a need for an evolution of policing, organizational structure, and the way police perceived their jobs (Peak & Glensor, 2004). In 1994, William Bratton and his team began a process of change that involved a different policing style and culture, structural reorganization, and a set of innovative policing strategies (Silverman & O’Connell, 1999).

Compstat played a central role during the implementation of this change process. Compstat began in 1994 as a struggle to create a simple system to collect daily crime patterns and increase the flow of communication among precinct commanders and departments (O’Connell & Straub, 2007). Over time, this system became an elaborate program where police officers could analyze the statistics in order to create crime maps showing important changes and emerging hot spots, and use them for operational and management purposes. Meanwhile, regular meetings began as a part of this system. In these meetings, officers discussed crime trends, questioned precinct commanders about their responses to crime, and worked out creative solutions and future strategies (Smith & Bratton, 2001). The Compstat initiative which incorporated the use of sophisticated technology, crime analysis, empowerment, and accountability for reducing crime became a phenomenon among police organizations the following year (Kelling & Sousa, 2001).

Under the leadership of Bratton, the NYPD was able to reduce crime at a remarkable rate. In 1994, for example, there was a 12% decline in New York City. The approval rating of the NYPD had a 73% positive rating, up from just 37% in a 1992 poll (Kocieniewski, 1996). All of these results increased scholars’ attention to the case of the NYPD and the story behind its success. Due to its success, Compstat has spread among police organizations as well as business organizations. The national publicity and scholarly interest crediting Compstat with the decline of crime rates increased its popularity and rapid diffusion among police organizations.

Compstat can be defined as a “goal-oriented strategic management process that builds upon police organizational paradigms of the past and blends them with the strategic management fundamentals of the business sector” (Walsh, 2001: 352). These fundamentals include strategic planning, accountability, constant monitoring and measurement, empowerment, and innovation. In a similar vein, Vito and colleagues (2005: 57) pointed out that “Compstat is a goal-oriented strategic management process that uses information technology, operational strategy, and managerial accountability to guide police forces”. In another definition, O’Connell and Straub (2007) placed emphasis on a variety of clever policing strategies that were developed and implemented in accordance with the organization’s goals.

1.2. Principles of Compstat

Compstat consists of 4 principles believed to give police organizations the capacity to reduce crime by forcing them to be more responsive to management direction and performance measurement: (1) ‘*timely and accurate information*’ made available at all levels in the organization, (2) ‘*determination of the most effective tactics*’ for specific problems, (3) ‘*rapid, focused deployment of resources*’ to implement these tactics, and (4) ‘*relentless follow-up and assessment*’ to learn what happened and make judgments (Bratton & Smith, 2001).

Information is a vital tool for effective policing. The success of Compstat certainly depended on collection of accurate and timely information regarding crime statistics and trends and the use of information for operational and management purposes. Traditionally, scholars have supported the idea that centralization of power, hierarchical structure, rigid bureaucracy, police culture, and the nature of police work make information flow and communication among different units, hierarchical lines, and ranks more difficult than other organizations. Even if there is information stored in databases, it is not used for operational and managerial purposes on a regular basis. The NYPD was not an exception, in that there was neither willingness nor an organized mechanism and cultural atmosphere for information sharing and communication across organizational lines (Silverman, 1999). During the history of policing in the United States, Compstat was the first point of collecting crime records on a daily basis in a shared database and developing mechanisms and culture for sharing information and best practices. Regular Compstat meetings played a central role in this process. These meetings connected all the various districts to headquarters and provided a ground for interactive, face-to-face, and horizontal communication across organizational lines, exchange of best practices and innovative strategies, and strategic modifications according to practices and tactics proven to work (O'Connell & Straub, 2007). Specifically, during these meetings, crime statistics and crime maps depicting the latest crime trends in the precincts were analyzed and used for the deployment of resources to necessary locations, coordination of joint efforts, development and revision of policing methods and tactics, and finally, assessment and monitoring of precinct commanders' performances based on crime rates and their efforts (Buntin, 1999). This information based system that favored and employed computer capabilities, crime-mapping software, and crime analysis assisted police commanders in obtaining early crime alerts, producing effective strategies to fight and prevent crime, and shutting down hot spots before they got out of control. In this sense, Compstat represents a proactive policing style that aims to reduce crime by making information and collective planning central to responding to crime rather than running from one call for service to another (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990).

1.3. Core Components of Compstat

According to Willis et al. (2007), the core management principles of Compstat were identified as (a) '*mission clarification*' by focusing on basic values and objectives, giving priority to operational objectives over administrative ones, (b) '*internal accountability*' for achieving these objectives, (c) '*geographical organization of operational command*,' (d) '*data-driven problem identification and assessment of the department's problem solving efforts*,' (e) '*organizational flexibility*' to implement the most promising strategies, and (f) '*innovative problem solving tactics*,' learning about what works and what does not work by following through with an empirical assessment of what happened and sharing this knowledge within the organization. All these principles and components were key for the success of Compstat in the NYPD.

1.4. Compstat Meetings

The Compstat process has two main components: The gathering and analysis of statistical data in the form of weekly a) '*Compstat reports*' and '*commander profile reports*' and b) '*the Compstat meetings*'. The Compstat meetings have been called to be the most visible part of the process. O'Connell and Straub (2007: 19) described the meetings as,

an open forum in which to evaluate the success or lack of success regarding initiatives, strategies, and tactics that have been implemented. Discussions are direct and require every participant to be familiar with specific incidents, patterns, and trends and to articulate cogent action plans. Each participant is held accountable for achieving results regardless of the unit or bureau to which he/she is assigned. The message is clear: poor performance must be corrected and good performance will be awarded.

These meetings can be seen as the basis of a management strategy that delegates authority, responsibility and accountability from the chief's level to the commanders of the precincts (Vito et al., 2005). Crime strategy meetings are normally held on a weekly basis, and many of the discussions are based on statistical analyses contained within the weekly Compstat report. These reports contain arrests, crime patterns, crime complaints, and police responses to these issues. The meetings are typically held in large rooms in which police managers can easily

display and see their results in the fight against crime on large computer screens. The featured commander makes a presentation regarding his or her precinct's crime situation and crime control strategy. After the presentation, the police chief or authorized deputy police chief questions the commanders about their specific crime problems, their analyses of patterns and trends, their crime control strategies, the precinct's quality of life conditions, current investigations, and coordination with other police units as well as suggested solutions and strategies at the precinct level (Moore, 2003).

Compstat meetings are influential as a platform for holding precinct commanders accountable for how they perform in the effort to control crime (Safir, 1997). Compstat reports and commander profile reports involve not only crime statistics but also the precinct commander's performance on various issues: "Personnel assigned, personnel absence rates, incidences of domestic violence and unfounded radio runs, radio car accidents, overtime expenditures, and summons activity" (Buntin, 1999: 19). All precinct commanders are aware that they will be held accountable for their results strategies adopted. Therefore, "regular Compstat meetings establish a measure of performance, accountability for achievement of the goals, and a sustainable process to ensure that the strategies have been carried out. These meetings also serve as a way to assess which strategies work and which ones do not" (Buntin, 1999: 16). As suggested by Buntin (1999: 16), "innovative tactics that seemed to work quickly came to light and were immediately communicated to everyone attending; just as failed tactics were quickly exposed". These meetings are a major vehicle for officers to communicate, share best practices and failures, and motivate one another as well as a department-wide learning and accountability experience. They force precinct commanders to develop new strategies for fighting crime that will transform the way in which crime fighting is handled (Silverman, 1999). Within knowledge management terms, these meetings can be considered as a platform for facilitating the expression of implicit knowledge to others within the organization.

2. Methodology

2.1 Research Setting

In this study, a large police department, Newark Police Department (NPD), in the east coast of the USA was selected for an in-depth analysis of Compstat principles and components. This police department was selected due to its similarities with the NYPD. Its large size, crime ridden environment, openness to change in the past, initiation of a number of innovative programs, reorganization of the department, and reduction in crime rates after the implementation of Compstat made this police department a comparable example to the NYPD and a good and interesting sample of study.

2.2. Data Collection

Data regarding implementation of Compstat principles and components in the NPD was collected through in-depth interviews of police officers in different ranks and positions, observation of the Compstat meetings and analysis of documents. The researcher conducted 26 interviews with members of the NPD. The basic sampling strategy was to reach a sample of individuals from diverse groups and varied functions within the organization. There were a representative number of officers from a wide range of ranks and units. This enabled cross-checking of information in an effort to establish different views held concerning the Compstat.

Observation was another data collection method used for this study. The main setting for observations was the Compstat meetings. The researcher attended nine meetings in 6 months and made observation approximately 18 hours. These meetings, as the most visible component of Compstat, presented a unique context in which to examine certain practices and conversations conducted in the scope of Compstat. Documents are critical to the function of organizations. In this study, a variety of documents were analyzed. These documents included the Compstat package and reports, organization web site, brochures, general orders and memos.

2.3. Data Analysis

The data obtained from the interviews, observation and aforementioned documents were used for the analysis and interpretation of the Compstat in this specific organization. The research took an inductive approach to examining the present phenomenon, insofar as the “categories emerge out of the examination of the data ... without firm preconceptions dictating relevance in concepts and hypotheses beforehand” (Walker, 1985: 58). The overall data analysis process can be considered in terms of two interrelated concepts: analysis and interpretation. Lindlof and Taylor (2002: 210-211) defined analysis: “the process of labeling and breaking down raw data and reconstituting them into patterns, themes, concepts, and propositions. Interpretation is the process of making construal”. In this process, both analysis and interpretation come together to clarify the meaning and make knowledge claims about the given research topic.

Specifically, the constant comparative method was used for analysis and interpretation. In fact, this method appears to be particularly useful in coding a large amount of texts, forming categories, establishing the conceptual boundaries of the categories, assigning the segments to categories, and summarizing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In order to prepare the data for analysis, all interview statements, observation notes and documents were logged into the computer. The Atlas-ti software that is designed for content analysis of large amounts of transcripts and other written documents was used for the analysis and interpretation of data, and it facilitated a coherent means of coding, categorizing, analyzing, and interpreting. This software provided the flexibility and non-hierarchical coding of data compatible with the constant comparative method.

The analysis process involved three stages: *open coding*, *axial coding*, and *selective coding*. Open coding can be considered as a form of content analysis where the data are read, coded, and categorized into themes on the basis of ‘look-alike’ characteristics rather than predetermined categories (Orlikowski, 1993). The purpose is to “group similar events, happenings, and objects under a common heading or classification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 103). Within this iterative process, a total of about 141 codes were generated. This process ended by classifying 141 codes under the 14 broader categories. The next step, axial coding, is “the process of relating categories to their subcategories and linking categories at the level of properties and dimensions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 142). During axial coding, these categories were reviewed and re-sorted in order to relate them to subcategories, linkages, and relationships that have greater explanatory power to answer research questions. The final step is selective coding, in which core categories are selected and systematically integrated to narrate what is happening, form general explanations, generate a larger theoretical stance, and make knowledge claims about the organization studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

2.4. Limitations

It must be stated that this single case study is limited in terms of statistical generalization. It is always possible that the police organizations with its different size, structure, crime environment, and leaders might have different processes, practices, and consequences that inevitably affect the success and failure of this model. Thus, this setting may not be truly reflective of the all police organizations. Either way, a single case study is always limited in terms of representativeness of other organizations even in the same region, industry, and occupation, and cannot be generalized to larger populations. Analyzing multiple organizations and checking the match of patterns between the cases would be helpful in addressing the limitations that emerge from reliance on one organization, but due to the difficulties of conducting research in different settings in terms of manageability and time, this study focused on only one police organization rather than multiple organizations. However, the tentative analytical generalization is still valid, appropriate and helpful for organizations that are willing to understand Compstat’s implementation (Yin, 1994). In this regard, the general patterns in this specific context can be generalized to a certain degree to any organization that has adapted Compstat into its structure.

3. Findings

The following section of this study will focus on the main principles and components of Compstat, how these principles and components are enacted in the meetings, and the limitations and opportunities in the practice of each principle and component.

3.1. Compstat Principles in the NPD

3.1.1. Collection of Accurate and Timely Information

In the Compstat era, policing relies on information much more than before. Some officers in the NPD even call the type of policing *information (intelligence) led policing*. Officers, especially commanding officers, need to know what is going on in their precincts or units; it might be anything from crime rates or, analysis of crimes to more specific information depending on crime type. As stated many times in meetings and interviews, '*not having available information*' is unacceptable in the Compstat era. Timely and accurate information collected using different mechanisms needs to be used to identify problems, analyze crimes, find patterns, and then determine appropriate tactics and plans to respond to crime, deploy resources accordingly, and finally measure the performance of the organization and commanders. This aspect of Compstat was widely recognized and cited by officers during the interviews and meetings as well as in documents. For instance, the police director spoke many times about the central role of accurate and timely information in the meetings:

The first thing is accurate and timely intelligence. You got to know what is going on and when it happened; time of the day, day of the week. You need to figure out the time of burglaries. We need to narrow the time. Then, we create a plan, do enforcement accordingly, and monitor the results. These are the phases those officers should be going through.

The same issue was confirmed by another officer as follows:

The most important thing is gathering information. Then, you have to act on that information and assess what you did. Specifically, you make sure that officers understand what their role in the organization is and make sure that you deploy them accordingly.

In Compstat, the first step is data collection. There are a number of units and officers responsible for the collection of information on a regular basis and using this information to analyze crime patterns and trends. For instance, a patrol officer is responsible for writing crime reports and entering them to the record management system on a daily basis. A supervisor needs to check this report and classify it for crime analysis purposes.

After the information regarding crimes is collected and entered into databases, the second step is analyzing these crimes and finding crime patterns. The crime rates and analysis of crimes, crime trends, and patterns compose of a big part of the Compstat package, which is extensively discussed in the Compstat meetings. In particular, the increase in certain types of crime is taken into account in these meetings with the intention of understanding the reasons behind this increase and possible steps to be taken to prevent or reduce it. In fact, the main assumption behind the strong focus on the analysis of crimes and patterns is to understand the phenomena and produce the data driven, smart policing tactics and strategies needed to reduce crime.

The analysis of crime incorporates the time and place of incidents, suspect and victim information, and the patterns that show similarities of incidents. A analysis is conducted over 28 day periods in the NPD. One officer gave an example of what the crime analysis includes for robbery as follows:

Compstat analysis is done for 28 days. For instance, we have 17 robberies from week 28 to week 31. This month last year, we had 22, far more. So, it is down 23 percent. We have 17 robberies, 17 victims, 37 suspects; five with gun, two with knife, and ten with strong arm; so we break down crime into patterns. We also break it down as outdoors, indoors, in terms of sectors, in terms of time; the busiest day, the busiest time. We do this analysis each week, each month, and each year. Then, we break it down.

The idea is to find a pattern in terms of time, region, or weapon and use it to respond to the crime in a smart way. During the meetings, the police director and the deputy chief ask questions to commanding officers about the crime analysis and patterns to get a sense of what is happening in each precinct. The following questions illustrated this point in the meetings:

Tell me about section 214, do you have any patterns?; There are 31 burglaries, did you do an analysis of burglary? How many patterns did you identify?; Let's talk about the analysis of robberies in section 215?; What is going on at X Street? Did you identify any patterns there?

Although the range of answers to these questions depends on type of crime, they are likely to get a response as follows: *"212 is the busiest sector; 20 of 38 with handgun. It is cell phones and cash oriented. There is an increase on Fridays. Friday 4-12 is the busiest time."* As confirmed by many officers, this kind of crime analysis and patterns is essential to figuring out when and why crimes happen, determining main crime trends quickly, and thus determining the most effective tactics to respond to crime and deploy resources appropriately.

A number of officers referred to the problems in the first phase. As observed in a Compstat meeting, a few precinct commanders complained about the lack of information and cohesion in these crime reports prepared by the patrols and detectives. One commander said:

They think that their job is just to write a report and click it. They do not understand the consequences of their actions and inactions. I explain why he needs to improve this report, but he just gives the same damn thing.

It seems like the reports of patrols and detectives are far from meeting the expectations of the managers. The quality or inferiority of information in these reports influences the effectiveness of the successive steps of Compstat. Specifically, the quality of crime analysis and crime patterns depends on the quality of these crime reports.

3.1.2. Determination of the Most Effective Tactics

The next principle of Compstat is determination of the most effective tactics. In theory, the information that is collected and stored in the databases is analyzed to see the crime rates, crime trends, and crime patterns, which should be the basis for the determination of the most effective tactics and plans to respond to crime in a proactive manner. This principle of Compstat as well as new, proactive policing approaches (*i.e., broken windows policing; problem oriented policing*) that provide a theoretical background for the determination of the most effective police tactics are widely recognized among officers and stated many times during the interviews. For instance, a commander stated, *"I believe Compstat was implemented very much to bring the commanders together to identify and talk about similarities regarding crime that affect each precinct and come up with strategic, proactive ways for attacking problems."* In this change initiative, as stated by the following commander, any plan, initiative, or tactic needs to rely on analysis of crimes and crime patterns, not just on personal experience of commanders or anecdotal evidence:

Years ago, who really cared what time the burglary happened at the house? Nobody cared about that. You were more reactive. We are more proactive, now. If someone broke into a home, or there was a robbery on the corner, then they would say "Okay. It happened. Let's go take the report". No one cared to get a plan and follow up on that. Where they did it, was it a Spanish guy, if he had a silver gun, what time of the day; we did not look at things like that before Compstat.

This kind of crime analysis provides a basis for targeted law enforcement. For instance, the following statement of an officer explains the link between Compstat and targeted enforcement as an effective approach to responding to crime:

Like the patrol officer, for instance, you have to make him feel like instead of patrolling in all the city aimlessly, which takes time and make them less efficient, you have to show them how Compstat and crime analysis can help them going to certain location at certain time to find a particular crime. He may, without Compstat, aimlessly patrol in his sector wondering, like, where he should be. Especially, it is helpful for the new guys, where the crime is, in which sector. Without Compstat, you put the guy out there. It is going to take a while before he finds out where the crime is. But we tell the new officers where the crime is. This is what you are going to find out.

In the implementation of this principle, the Compstat meetings have a central role. These meetings bring people together and provide space to talk about strategies and plans to respond to crime and to be held accountable for the plans in front of peers and the upper echelon. It is regularly observed in the meetings that the questions regarding crime statistics, analysis, and patterns are followed by the questions of the police director and deputy chief regarding the response plan and activities conducted in the scope of this plan. For instance, after questioning the crime analysis and crime patterns in a precinct (*i.e., what is your analysis for burglary? what is your analysis for sector 212?*), the deputy chief regularly asked commanders questions like,

What was the plan? What did you do? What is your net team doing about this? What is the plan for this weekend? What is the narcotics plan right now? Do you have plans in the long run to solve this problem? Do you have plans for the next step if you handle the problem in this region? What are we concentrating on?

Commanders mostly gave a number of plans and activities as a response to these questions, such as patrol presence and deployment of more personnel in hot spots, joint efforts of different units, surveillance, increased visibility by patrolling during the busiest sectors and time, early morning enforcement, and vehicle stops. Then, the deputy chief usually followed with questions to understand in what ways these response plans match the analysis of the crime, how they help to solve the crime problem and the activities conducted as a part of these plans.

In fact, this is the time when most commanders were strongly criticized by the upper echelon. They were either criticized for the plan itself or the number of activities as a part of this plan. For instance, in one meeting, the police director criticized the commander for the plan he suggested:

Presence is great. But, it is not the solution. The solution is putting handcuffs on people and then putting the presence over there. We want to stop crime. We can stop it by putting on handcuffs. We suppress it when it is occurring and where it is occurring. Then, you have to have some plan to regress it. Has anybody heard about early morning narcotics enforcement as the solution to burglary? Narcotics enforcement is the easiest way to reduce the crime. What we want to be doing is getting intelligence, arrest people related to narcotics. Okay. Let's start doing these guys.

Then, the director stated that part of the problem is lack of analysis, which needs to be the basis for the plan:

If you don't have the analysis, then you cannot set up or put together an intelligent plan. It sounds like you are not on the right track. You want to do enforcement without knowing because you don't have the data to back you up.

As shown, the director may criticize these plans in terms of the lack of analysis or inefficiency in solving certain types of crime. As explained by an officer, there are also certain times where the analysis and plan match each other and help commanders to solve the crime problem:

From where I see, most of the time commanders do a good job responding based on the analysis they come up with. For example, a couple of weeks ago, there were robbery problems in the second or third precincts. Their analysis was these were night time robberies. There were a group of guys in a car. They drive up to somebody. One of the guys gets out of car and takes some of the money and jumps back in. So, based on that instead of focusing quality of life and FIS, I remember they started doing traffic stops in the area they are likely to be around. As these guys are carrying a gun, they don't feel comfortable stopping the car.

Sometimes, the police director or deputy chief expressed satisfaction with the plan and productivity and thanked the commanders. But, more often, they expressed displeasure for the plans and productivity and ask these commanders to come up with a more comprehensive plan.

Another important point regarding the determination of the most effective tactics was the questions in the Compstat meetings about activities that need to be part of the plan. For instance, if vehicle stops in hot spots are part of the tactic suggested by commanders, they are likely to be asked the number of vehicle stops and their consequences. As stated by one officer,

If shootings are up in your precincts, you should be prepared not only to address that but also what you have done, what your men have done, what you plan to do, and you need the numbers, the activities to show, to prove that you have done that.

In parallel to this statement of officer, the upper echelon asks specific numbers to check the degree of implementation of the plan and performance of the officers. For instance, the deputy chief spoke about the activities implemented as part of a plan in one meeting: *"What kind of activities do you have? How many burglary warrants did you prepare? How many burglary arrests did you have?"* Depending on the numbers, the police director and deputy chief either expressed satisfaction for the productivity rates or wanted commanders to increase the numbers.

As shown, in the case of the NPD, Compstat reinforces the need for commanders to take responsibility for their district by familiarizing themselves with the problems and making plans to respond to them. At the same time, the commanders are compelled to be more proactive, think

about crime plans, and follow the latest trends in policing. However, there are a number of problems in the adaptation of this principle, such as lack of compatibility between crime analysis/patterns and crime plans suggested by commanders, the degree of effectiveness of plans for certain crime types, the number of activities conducted as a part of each plan, and the range of innovation and creativity.

3.1.3. Deployment of Resources

Another principle of Compstat is rapid deployment of resources. In theory, crime was analyzed and the analysis was used for the determination of the most effective tactics, which is followed by rapid and appropriate deployment of personnel and other resources according to the tactic and strategies. In other words, the resources are deployed to endorse the tactics and strategies.

In the NPD, It seemed like officers were more in tune with the principle of rapid deployment of personnel and resources based on patterns and analysis than with the link between crime analysis and determination of effective tactics. Officers often commented on the role of Compstat as being geographically driven and fluid in their deployment. They especially appreciated the contribution of this change initiative for bringing promptness and flexibility in the deployment of resources, and reinforcing the coordination of deployment between precincts and special units such as Narcotics and Gang. For instance, one commander stated how Compstat contributes to the coordination of efforts and resources to respond to crime:

For me as the commander of the third precincts, I have to communicate with the narcotics division for deployment in high narcotic areas. Gang squad, I have to coordinate my efforts with them, we have to communicate with each other to address my gang problems. I think this is happening under Compstat.

The upper echelon wants to make sure that commanders deploy their resources to endorse their plans and strategies and coordinate their resources in the implementation of the plans. There are a number of examples of how this is happening in the meetings. It was common to hear questions from the upper echelon such as, *"How many cops did you deploy in that sector? Did you put up more patrols there? Did you talk to the supervisor who is in charge of that unit to coordinate your manpower?"*

Another point that needs to be mentioned was the link between crime analysis and deployment of resources to hot spots. Commanders wanted their officers to concentrate on hot spots and to ensure that officers know what to look for and synchronize their efforts. Most of the officers in the NPD said that their analysis of crime affects where they deploy resources. In particular, commanders sent their officers to the place that is called problematic areas or hot spots. For instance, one commander explained that,

Compstat has really changed the way of policing in general. The analysis of crime affects the way we deploy officers and where you deploy them. If you already know what these problems and where, a patrol car can be directed accordingly.

Another point mentioned in interviews was the Compstat's contribution to the rapid deployment of resources by decreasing bureaucratic barriers. Compstat, especially Compstat meetings, where all critical people in the department gather in one room, allows for a less cumbersome and more rapid allocation of resources in problematic areas. For instance, one commander stated,

You bring people from all departments. I mean, you have people from the support services bureau, so if you have a command that has a particular problem with vehicles, radio, or something to respond to the increased number of crimes, because the highest rank of people is sitting in the meeting, things get done.

However, there are certain problems in the adaptation of this principle in the NPD. The most common problem mentioned by officers was resource constraints. Many officers commented that the NPD has limited resources. Even if they have plans, it is not possible to carry them out, as people and funding are limited. For instance, a commander said, *"In some cases where there is a high concentration, like in narcotics areas, drug bazaars, things like that, precinct commanders just did not have the resources to handle it."*

Another limitation was the extent of coordination among different units in deploying resources synchronically. There were many examples from the meetings where the police

director and deputy chief expressed dissatisfaction with the coordination and asked commanders to meet after the Compstat meeting to coordinate their efforts. There are statements in minutes of meeting such as, "*Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs in case of emergency.*" There are more examples of these kinds of statements that illustrate the lack of coordination between different units in the NPD.

3.1.4. Relentless Follow Up and Assessment

The most defining principle of Compstat is relentless follow up and assessment. Most of the change initiatives, even the best ones in theory, fail as there is not any strong follow up mechanism that create a sense of obligation among organizational members to adopt a change initiative. In contrast to other initiatives, Compstat in the NPD has certain aspects that allow the upper echelon relentless follow up and assessment of officers on a regular basis. Thus, it creates feedback loops at a higher level, whereas they existed at the lower level only before.

The form and content of the Compstat meetings in the NPD have a key role in this process. As mentioned before, these meetings have been held on a weekly basis for eight straight years with the participation of the upper echelon in the NPD, until the last administration. In the new administration, the meetings are conducted once or twice a month. Either way, the commanders in the NPD know that there will be a meeting next week or in two weeks in which they will be questioned on a number of topics, including the problems from the previous meetings. The following statement of one officer illustrated how this mechanism works: "*You put them hot seat. Commanding officers say that I am going to address this particular issue in my command, when they come back I bet they do.*" If these commanders do not address the problems in their command, as stated by the same officer, this is likely to get a question as follows in the meetings: "*Hey commander, talk to me about the issue you said you are going to address last Compstat. Then, you are going to make sure that you address that issue before going there.*" This system forces commanders to consider if there is something to be done or, updated before the next meeting where they will be put in the hot spot. In addition, some officers in the NPD pointed out that this relentless follow up is needed especially in larger organizations. As stated by one officer, "*Here, you may not see a patrolman for months. That is why you need relentless follow-up.*" As shown, these gatherings provide a platform to follow up on problems and initiatives in such a big organization on a regular basis, which is very critical for the success of the other components and principles of Compstat.

The second aspect of the meetings is the participation of the upper echelon and their involvement in the decision making process. Commanders know that there will be a person from a higher level in the meetings to question them in front of their peers and subordinates, and evaluate their performance, which inevitably influences their career in the department. For instance, a commander in the department stated,

Compstat increased the feedback loop in the department and it also did at a very much higher level. When the chief of department sits in these meetings, he is brought into that system. So, decisions that were made at Compstat meetings are his. It is not like I told my subordinate to go and deal with the problem in which there is not any follow up or checking. So, this constant, relentless follow up was the other key to making things work.

The end product of this process was that commanders faced increased competition among themselves; they become part of the feedback loop, and became focused on their command all the time.

Assessment is another important aspect of this principle. The Compstat unit prepares Compstat package on a weekly basis to present information about all precincts and units to the upper echelon. Similarly, crime control officers in each precinct prepare a Compstat package just for their commanders. Compstat packages basically have two interlocked parts which provide a base for the assessment of performance. One part is about crime rates, crime analysis, and patterns (*i.e., time, place, victim, and suspect*) for each crime type. The crime statistics that are presented compared to those of the previous year are the most important indicator for the assessment of commanding officers. Commanding officers are questioned on any increase, and its causes, and asked for their plan to respond to it.

The precincts commander profile is another important part of the Compstat package. This one page overview shows the overall performance of the commander who is responsible for each precinct. It includes information regarding the names, positions and ranks of people in managerial positions, complaints against personnel, average response time, sick time, and precinct overtime and its monetary equivalent. In addition, there is an overview of number of arrests, field interrogations, quality of life summonses, and search warrants for all crimes. These numbers (*i.e., arrests, field investigations, search warrants, vehicle stops, cases closed or open*) are also prepared for each crime type, such as robbery, narcotics, and burglary in sections that are designed to give specific information for each crime type.

All these numbers are indicators that are used to gain an overview of the activity of each precinct. Commanders are held responsible for the activity in their precincts. These written documents allowed the upper echelon to check these numbers relentlessly and take necessary measures to control crime. They questioned commanders on these numbers in the Compstat meetings or other settings. It was clearly observed in the meetings that the most important indicator was crime rates. If crime is down in a precinct, a decrease in productivity is understandable. However, if crime is up, but productivity is down, then this is a bad indicator. In such a case, it is thought that either someone is not doing something or they are not where they are supposed to be.

However, there were certain problems in the practice of this principle. First of all, while some indicators were prioritized depending on the current problems, some indicators such as response time, and sick time were not discussed in any of the meetings, which results in the ignorance of these indicators by the officers. Other than this, some officers stated that some ranked officers come to these meetings unprepared all the time, but they still stay in their positions. This perception may undermine the purpose behind the principle of relentless follow up and assessment.

Finally, the police director of the NPD usually gave a speech at the end of meetings and supported the idea that police organizations can make a difference in crime rates, as illustrated in the case of the NPD. In this environment, commanders should take responsibility for both the increase and decrease in crime rates in their precincts. However, it is strongly suggested by many academicians that social and economic factors may also influence crime rates as much as the performance of a police organization. Many of the commanders seem to partly share this assumption, but they are compelled to take responsibility for any kind of increase in crime rates. This point seems to create a paradox for some officers in the NPD, where they avoid expressing their thoughts on this issue clearly. Based on these findings, the Table 5 illustrated these four principles, their contribution, and limitations in the practice.

Table 1: Compstat Principles

PRINCIPLES	CONTRIBUTION	LIMITATIONS
<p>COLLECTION of ACCURATE and TIMELY INTELLIGENCE</p>	<p>Daily and accurate information collected by alternative sources Analysis of crime on a regular basis Analysis of crime trends Data driven, smart, timely response to crime Production and exhibition of a wide range of documents Information-led Policing</p>	<p>Not entering crime reports into system in a timely manner Inferiority of crime reports Inferiority or inadequacy of crime analysis and crime patterns Overdose of information / Difficulty digesting all information</p>
<p>DETERMINATION of the MOST EFFECTIVE TACTICS</p>	<p>Effective, data driven, smart tactic and plans in responding to crime Proactive manner in responding to crime Targeted law enforcement</p>	<p>Degree of effectiveness of plans Lack of compatibility between police tactics and crime analysis Inadequate number of activities conducted as a part of police tactics (productivity rates) Need for more comprehensive plans Lack of coordination putting the plans into practice</p>

		Degree of creativity and innovation of plans
DEPLOYMENT of RESOURCES	Rapid and appropriate deployment of resources (based on the patterns and analysis) Being geographically driven and fluid in the deployment Flexibility and decreased bureaucratic barriers to deploy resources Support for coordination among different units	Resource constraints Extent of coordination among different units in deploying resources synchronically Cultural values to follow bureaucracy in deploying resources
RELENTLESS FOLLOW UP and ASSESSMENT	Mission clarification (crime reduction) Create a sense of obligation (regular meetings) Monitor officer performance and department on a regular basis Create a sense of accountability Provide a platform to follow up on problems and new initiatives Increase competition and career orientation Increase performance measurement capacity Help to see the compatibility between crime plans and productivity numbers	Ignorance of certain performance indicators Lack of career planning based on performance Focus solely on the increase of crime rates that brings negativity into discussion Ignorance of social, economic factors in the increase or decrease of crime rates

3.2. Compstat Components

3.2.1. Accountability

The literature on Compstat attaches considerable importance to this component of Compstat. In keeping with this, accountability along with information sharing is the most common words used to describe Compstat in the NPD. In fact, the main point behind this component is that officers should be held accountable for whether they know their command and what they are doing in their command. This component were put into practice in the NPD basically by putting commanders on the hot spot in the Compstat meetings and questioning them about crime in their districts. The following statement of one officer clearly shows how this component works:

I believe that Compstat is basically for accountability, holding people accountable, putting them in the spot light, putting them in front of peers, asking what they are doing to solve problems, and holding them more accountable for personal integrity, personal communication, and effectiveness. That is what Compstat is.

As stated, the critical part of the accountability component is putting commanders on the hot spot in the meetings to make sure that they are doing their work properly. Commanders feel obliged to answer the questions of the upper echelon in these meetings avoid being humiliated in front of the upper echelon, peers, and subordinates, and to show their performance, and possibly to be promoted. This mechanism seems to be very effective in terms of forcing commanders to take more responsibility for crime problems and solutions in their district. The following statements of one officer confirmed this point as follows:

I think we needed it. That is number one. I think it was a good idea. When I was patrol, I would rarely see the captain. I don't think they were aware of what was going on in their precincts. They did not write a report daily as we do right now. I think when we started Compstat, the precinct captains become more accountable. They open their eyes to see I have a burglary problem here; I have a robbery problem in this part of the city.

As shown, it is clear that this mechanism required commanding officers to take more responsibility, to consider the problems in his/her district and possible solutions, to communicate more with other units, and to get feedback from the lower level as a part of preparation for the Compstat meeting.

There are a number of issues that were stated as a part of accountability. The first thing was empowerment of commanding officers, which should go along with accountability. In other words, before holding commanders accountable for their action and inactions, the upper echelon should provide resources and delegate more decision making to them for deploying resources, and adopting crime tactics and strategies in their district. In the NPD, while some officers stated that the police director empowered commanding officers, other officers found the level of empowerment and delegation limited compared to the NYPD. In fact, observation of the meetings confirmed that the police director and deputy chief frequently criticized commanding officers for their decisions regarding crime plans and deployment, and make final decisions in these meetings. An officer explained the end product of this manner as follows: *"I think in order to encourage people to make a decision; you have to give them the ability to make them. If you don't, you grow up a culture eventually that won't make decisions."* Similarly, another officer talked about general situation in the NPD in terms of empowerment as follows: *"Commanding officers do not have a lot of power and a lot of authority."* It is fair to say that most of the officers believe that they were held accountable and kept responsible for any problems in their district or unit while they did not have enough authority and power to make decisions. The observation of the process confirms this is a valid concern for the NPD and creates dissatisfaction and the paradox of responsibility without power.

The second point that is commonly stated by the director is the need to hold the lower level accountable for their actions. In the meetings, the police director constantly mentioned the fact that commanding officers should hold officers in their command accountable, as he did commanding officers in the Compstat meetings. For instance, the director spoke about this point in a meeting as follows: *"Listen, this is how it is going to be done. Everybody does their parts. Talk to your lieutenant and sergeants and hold them accountable for their actions."* He stated that he has meetings with his staff regularly and suggested commanding officers do the same to keep their staff accountable. However, the level of accountability of the lower level seems to be limited compared to that of middle level managers. As stated by a commander, he makes regular meetings to keep his staff accountable while this is not true for each commander. Compstat in the NPD did not have any defined mechanism to ensure this point. It seems like some commanders keep doing what they are used to doing and neglect putting this into practice.

The final point is the manner of questioning. The tone of the meetings changed in a positive way in this new administration. However, instead of accountability, it is still like an interrogation in which the upper echelon questions the middle level managers. As suggested by one officer, there is a need for open communication where *"officers at least ask one or two questions as to how he (chief/director) can do better and how he is going to help him do his job better."* As will be discussed later, this design of Compstat discourages officers from asking question, communication openly, and improving their practices.

3.2.2. Mission Clarification

The other component of Compstat is mission clarification. This component points out the need for emphasizing the core reason of the organization's existence and announcing clearly defined measurable goals and benchmark for success. These are intended to help police organizations to function more effectively and instilling in police officers a sense of shared commitment. It was clear from the statements of officers and observation of meetings that the NPD was adept at implementing the mission clarification component of Compstat. For instance, the following excerpt of one officer shows that Compstat played a positive role in terms of instilling a shared commitment and purpose among officers in the NPD: *"It has improved our organization because we have a direction. We have a vision. We have a direct course. Before we had Compstat, we wouldn't know what is going on."*

Consistent with the idea that police could have a significant effect on crime, most of the police organizations that have adopted Compstat as well as the NPD focused on crime

reduction as the main goal. As observed in the Compstat meetings, commanding officers were basically questioned about crime statistics, which were compared with those of previous years and periods. The upper echelon wanted commanding officers to improve upon what they had previously done. These crime statistics and other performance measures (*i.e., arrests, warrants, and response time*) set a measurable indicator for the performance of commanding officers. The following comment of the police director illustrated these points: *"We are at the end of first quarter. This year most types of crime decreased significantly. That is pretty damn good. The shooting rate is a little bit lower on average than we had last year."* In such an environment, it seems like officers at different levels of the NPD have been bought into the fundamental crime fighting and crime reduction mission of Compstat. For instance, one officer stated that,

Compstat brought more structure to this job. We are also more goal-oriented, just as private companies. We have goals and objectives now, which are reducing crime. Compstat is the driven force behind our very purpose. Compstat played a definite role.

Other than the crime rates, Compstat allows the upper echelon to prioritize certain crime types and assignments. Many police officers stated that response time was a big problem in the NPD before Compstat. When the Compstat process started, the director focused constantly on response time, and reduced it to less than 5 minutes for certain crimes. The current director in the NPD put more emphasize on certain crime types and questioned commanders mostly for these prioritized crime types. For instance, in a meeting, the director said,

Hey guys, here are the priorities again: The first thing is shooting. It is the most important. We want to increase robbery squads and really focus on shootings. The second thing is robberies. We need to talk about how many shootings are related to narcotics. The fact is that robbery is leading to shootings. The next priority on the scale is burglary. We had to prioritize. Priorities are very simply shootings, robberies, and burglary.

As illustrated, the director regularly gave messages regarding the priorities of the NPD. Even if he did not directly state these priorities in each meeting, he questioned commanding officers about these crime types, which created a sense of priorities and goals both for the director and officers in general. The following statement of one officer shows how this mechanism influenced the practices of officers in the NPD:

Compstat has brought a part that we prioritize what we do instead of just doing everything. If we have problems with quality of life issues with people drinking on corners, instead of writing parking tickets at that time we can do it later, going back to quality of life issues. So, that is where Compstat helps to change the officer's perspective instead of being so general.

As shown, Compstat allowed the upper echelon to set department wide measurable goals which were used to assess officers, prioritize goals, and instill in officers a sense of shared commitment. However, it is not clear the degree of shared commitment among front line officers, their perception of organizational goals and objectives, and the reflection of these goals into the daily practice of these officers.

3.2.3. Innovative Problem Solving Tactics

The other component of Compstat is innovative problem solving tactics. It is suggested that Compstat supports the use of technological tools (*i.e., crime maps, statistical analyses*) and use of innovative or best practices that go beyond officers' own experience. The situation in the NPD shows that this component of Compstat has been adopted in a limited manner. There are certainly a number of examples observed in the meetings and expressed in the personal accounts of officers regarding how Compstat in the NPD supported innovative, smart problem solving, and sharing of best practices. For instance, in one meeting, the police director assigned a person to talk about how to check pawn shops accurately. In another meeting, an officer talked about new ways to find stolen mobile phones. This person was asked to contact mobile phone companies and share the possibilities with other staff in the organization. It may not be wrong to conclude that some officers saw these meetings as an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge and capacity in front of the peers and the upper echelon.

In addition to this first-hand observation, a number of officers gave examples of innovative problem solving in the NPD in these approximately 16 years of the Compstat process. The following example given by an officer shows how Compstat can provide a basis for innovation and smart policing tactics:

There is always a better way of policing. People should be open-minded about it. People come together and focus on a problem, you are surprised. One of the former administrations did something which was great, we had sixty people in this room and we had an issue. I think it was rape. There was a rapist. Everybody said what they did. The director asked what else we can do. We did everything. No, there should be something else we can do. He did not have the answer. Then, he told people that "Today is Thursday. By Monday morning, three o'clock, I want everyone in this room. Go back to your office and type something for me." He had sixty reports. He read all of them. He came with 25 additional ideas on Monday how to address that problem.

This statement clearly shows that Compstat can play a positive role for innovation through bringing people together to talk, brainstorm to identify problems and come up with alternative ideas to solve the problems.

Another point regarding the link between Compstat and innovative problem solving is the contribution of Compstat to the use new technologies and databases. It was observed in the NPD that information technologies play a central role in the implementation of Compstat. As stated by one officer, the need for accurate and timely information and information sharing in Compstat compelled the NPD to adopt technology quickly and use these technological tools for smart and innovative policing:

So, the Compstat unit has essentially built up their own reporting system instead of the old system. Reports were created at least three months behind and often almost six. The preliminary statistics were a month old. So, they wanted preliminary statistics to be available weekly. They wanted the mapping staff to be available at least in the meetings very quickly.

Another officer spoke about the contribution of Compstat to the coordination and collaboration of forces and the sharing of best practices as an example of an innovation.

As we go through our process of looking at our information, talking with other officers in these meetings, identifying problems and problematic areas that possibly exceed my borders, you sometimes combine forces with another city or another district. Or, you get help from other people around that table. So, is it innovative, is it a new thinking. I don't know, but because this process is in place, it challenges us to try to do better and use all the resources that are available to us rather than just sit and do whatever we do and not worry about arrest.

It seems like the real contribution of Compstat in the NPD is not its support for innovative tactics, but the use of the right tactics at the right time and place by analyzing crime and emerging crime patterns. In fact, commanding officers in the NPD seemed to become adept at collecting crime information, presenting this information in a comparable manner, and making analyses that basically focus on the time and place of crime incidents. However, these commanding officers exhibited little appreciation for evaluating the meaning of this data or patterns beyond time and place. This certainly limited the level of innovation in the NPD.

Other than the limitations at the level of analyzing and evaluating data, it is stated that the early forms of the Compstat meetings played a negative role in improving this component of Compstat in the NPD. For instance, one officer said,

I don't know because director George Brown says all the time, what do you guys think. However, most of the time, he does not get any responses. Again, it is probably the reflection of how people are used to Compstat being done over the years. People did not speak up pretty much. You would be afraid of opening your mouth. To me, it is partly the same because some people just don't say things as they are afraid of what might come out of their mouth. In the old Compstat they were so used to being told what to do.

In fact, the observation of the meetings confirms the statement of this officer. Even, in the current form of the meetings, when the police director asked contribution of officers at the end of meetings, the common answer is, "No sir". In fact, the following statement of an officer shows how early forms of meetings influenced the current form of meetings:

My personal experience is that I answer the question believing the reasonable answer, but they did not believe the right answer. So, they cut me off and put me out. Compstat cannot be that. You have to bring the ideas of everybody together. I am not saying accepted as value, but you should listen to him because as a person what he says can generate a good idea for a good strategy.

Some officers explained the limitation of this component in the NPD by referring to human nature and the arrangements of meetings as limiting innovation. Consider the following comments of one officer, *“As far as people, human nature is the same pretty much all over the place. I think for the most part people tend not to volunteer too much information. Sometimes, people don’t offer their opinions because they don’t want extra work.”* Another officer pointed out pressure in these meetings:

When you speak in a meeting, it might be criticized or looked at by the other people as trying to get too close to the boss. Or you might think is he going to make fun of it? Is he going to transfer me? So, when you sit in a room with your peers, there are a lot of people, a lot of pressure. Sometimes, people just don’t say things in open meetings, but in a one on one meeting, he would be more proactive.

In addition, the design of communication in meetings as question-answer form rather than open platform seems to limit officers getting involved in the discussion. Therefore, it seems like the design of meeting (*i.e., number of participants, meeting room, peer pressure*), design of communication (*i.e., question-answer form*), history of police organization (*i.e., early forms of meetings: intimidation and humiliation*), cultural values and personal attitudes of officers in the organization (*i.e., avoid extra work, defensive culture*), and organizational constraints in terms of resources restrict officers in expressing and sharing information freely, and as a result, limit innovation in problem solving and policing tactics in the NPD.

3.2.4. Geographical Organization of Operational Command

This component of Compstat stresses that police departments need to empower precinct commanders by increasing their share of resources and their decision making authority in their geographical units. It criticizes centralization of authority, strict bureaucracy and hierarchy, and lack of information sharing between precincts and specialized units.

In terms of empowerment, there has been progress in the NPD after the implementation of Compstat. Structurally, the narcotics teams, gang units, and other specialized units have a number of officers that work under the command of the precinct commanders. These officers increased precinct commanders’ capacity to respond to different crime types by taking into account the problems and needs of his/her precincts, increasing communication, and enabling them to conduct independent operations from central units. For instance, one officer said,

Precinct commanders became metaphorically a quarter-back. He is the guy who is on the scene, responsible for that command. A few hundred officers are assigned precincts. Even though detectives are reporting different chain of command, they start to work closely.

Observation of meetings confirms that precinct commanders can make decisions regarding where, when, and for what purpose to assign these officers and the number of officers in order to implement their plan. However, their decisions and plans for using these officers were regularly criticized by the upper echelon. In many cases, the upper echelon made changes to these decisions and plans. In fact, considering these meetings and other settings in the department, some officers in the NPD stated that the level of empowerment in using resources and making decision still remains limited or at a symbolic level.

Another reflection of this component can be observed in the way territorial divisions are perceived by commanding officers. Before Compstat, commanding officers did not have any communication or joint efforts with the other precincts or the narcotics divisions. They did not even know about or take any responsibility for crimes that happened in other precincts. Nevertheless, the implementation of Compstat changed this manner by bringing commanders together regularly under a unified structure and compelling them to coordinate their efforts. This change is explained by one officer as follows:

The difference is in communication. Prior to this Compstat, there was not a lot of communication across precincts. Things were very specific and territorial. We had different segments of the department only worrying about their specific community. It was not taken into consideration that someone else's problems in another community would also affect their part, too. So, we were very territorial and there was not a lot of communication.

In terms of the upper echelon compelling commanders to have joint efforts, the following excerpts from the minutes of meetings are enlightening: *"Captain A and B need to coordinate and make sure that there is a joint effort to supply the needs at emergency."*

Finally, in the Compstat era, each district divided into smaller geographical divisions called 'sectors'. These small divisions facilitated commanding officers' to define geographically smaller hot spots, and assignment of front line officers to these sectors, which thus enabled them to develop a more targeted enforcement. The following excerpts from minutes of meeting show how sectors enabled the upper echelon to have a more targeted enforcement: *"A detailed plan to address crime in 212 sectors near shooting area; it must be submitted to the deputy chief by tomorrow."* As briefly explained, Compstat increased the capacity of precinct commanders to respond to crime and the level of information sharing and coordination, whereas the level of empowerment for using resources and making decision remained limited. This situation conflicts with the central idea of Compstat, which is empowering commanders and holding them accountable for how they use this power.

3.2.5. Data Driven Problem Identification and Assessment of Problem Solving Efforts

This component basically assumes that police organizations need to obtain and use accurate and timely crime statistics to identify the organization's problems and assess commanders' performance instead of relying on personal experience and/or anecdotal evidence. As mentioned in other components, the NPD has mechanisms to collect timely and accurate crime information through databases, which are used to analyze crime and emerging crime trends to identify problems and make rational and smart decisions on crime reduction strategies. It is clear that the NPD officers believe that Compstat contributed to the identification of problems and the implementation of organization wide, systematic, efficient crime reduction strategies, which are assessed relentlessly through Compstat meetings. For instance, one officer commented,

Prior to 1996, I don't know that there was a concerted effort to address crime in the way that Compstat allows you to focus on crime. I don't think that there was an organized methodology department wide. But, Compstat helped us to understand the problem and pushed a method to everybody. And everybody had used the same tools to focus on crime. They were measured and judged on whether they were successful. So, Compstat is generally a very positive thing for the department.

Another officer pointed out that Compstat contributes to the identification of problems as follows: *"The idea of Compstat was really to bring attention to what crime problems were out here. It was about discovery and correction of the problems."* As mentioned, the availability of timely and accurate data and crime analysis allowed officers to discover crime trends and, crime problems in their districts before it is too late and come up with strategies to address these problems.

In terms of assessment of problem solving efforts, the Compstat meetings provide a platform to talk about problem solving efforts and their effectiveness in reducing crime. The main criterion for the assessment of problem solving efforts, specifically police tactics and strategies was crime rates. If there was a decrease in crime rates, the problem solving strategy was believed effective or vice versa. Also, as stated by many officers, the strategies which were proven to work or effective distributed immediately in the Compstat meetings. In spite of the number of criteria to assess problem solving efforts was limited, taking into account that crime reduction was common goal of police organizations, this situation in the NPD seems to be rational.

3.2.6. Organizational Flexibility

The other component of Compstat in the literature is organizational flexibility. Police organizations need to respond promptly to changing conditions and opportunities, and non-routine work demands that will emerge citywide on a daily basis. This component addresses the fact that the centralized bureaucratic structure dominated by detailed rules and regulations, excessive paperwork, and operational protocols limit flexibility of organizations in responding effectively and promptly to ever changing work demands (Jermier & Berkes, 1979).

In the case of the NPD, it is stated many times that commanding officers need to know crime trends and problems in their district by collecting and analyzing data on a regular basis, which enables them to see rapidly changing conditions, specifically emerging hot spots, and to deploy and re-allocate resources in these areas. For instance, one officer commented about Compstat's contribution to the NPD's ability to adapt to changing conditions:

It helps us to conduct our jobs every day. In a city like Metrocity, it is so busy and changes so rapidly that if we did not have this model, we would be anywhere. We would not adapt to these changing conditions.

Another officer pointed out how Compstat increased the speed and focus of the organization's response to hot spots: *"It is about knowing where your problems are on a daily basis and using your resources to address those problems before it is too late."*

Observation of the meetings confirms that crime analysis and crime mapping enabled commanding officers to see problematic areas quickly and compelled them to direct more resources to these areas promptly. This is because these commanding officers were questioned on the problems in their district and on their response. Most of the time, commanding officers expressed the need to allocate more resources (*i.e., increase patrol, increase number of officers*) as a part of the tactics and strategies used to respond to problems. Similarly, the police director talks about the priorities of the department and the need to manage resources accordingly.

However, officers also mentioned some challenges that limited the NPD in flexibility in terms of resource and manpower allocation on a need basis. The first challenge was lack of resources that limit allocation of resources rapidly on the need basis. Many officers pointed out that lack of resources limited their capacity to allocate resources as they wish. The second challenge was attitudes of police managers, who tend to follow routine procedures instead of changing resource allocation on the need basis. The Table 6 illustrates the implementation of Compstat components in the MPD. It specifically shows the contribution of each component and limitations stated by the study participants, observed by the researcher, and reflected in documents.

Table 2: Compstat Components

COMPONENT	CONTRIBUTION	LIMITATIONS
ACCOUNTABILITY	Requirement to take more responsibility Requirement to consider and learn the problems in his/her command and possible solutions More communication with other units and precincts More communication with his/her staff	The degree of empowerment (the paradox of responsibility without enough power) The degree of holding accountable lower level officers (in precincts and other units) Manner of questioning that discourage free flow of ideas, honest and sincere dialogue
MISSION CLARIFICATION	Increase the focus on crime fighting and crime reduction Bring department wide goals, objectives, and vision Increase shared commitment Prioritize certain crime types and assignments	The degree of reflection of department wide goals and objectives in the daily practices of front line officers The degree of shared commitment among frontline officers The degree of dissemination of goals, objectives, and commitment to the front line officers

<p align="center">INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING TACTICS</p>	<p>Increase innovative and smart problem solving Increase the degree of sharing best practices Use of crime analysis and patterns to identify problems and alternative solutions</p>	<p>Tendency to follow traditional tactics and strategies and resource constraints The level of analysis and evaluation of data Early forms of the Compstat meetings that discouraged free talk Human nature to avoid extra work</p> <p>Defensive culture Communication design (peer pressure, question-answer form)</p>
<p align="center">GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND</p>	<p>Increase the capacity and independency of precincts to respond different crime types Increase communication and coordination between different units Geographical analysis of crime that helps to define problematic areas and use targeted enforcement</p>	<p>Level of empowerment to make decision and allocate resources</p>
<p align="center">DATA DRIVEN PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION and ASSESMENT of DEPARTMENT PROBLEM SOLVING EFFORTS</p>	<p>Help officers to identify crime problems by analyzing crime Bring organization wide, systemic, and effective crime reduction strategies Relentless assessment of crime problems, initiatives through the Compstat meetings</p>	<p>Level of crime analysis that is far from identifying underlying causes of crime problems Cultural tendency to rely on personal experience and anecdotal evidence</p>
<p align="center">FLEXIBILITY</p>	<p>Increase the speed of response to problematic areas Rapid and appropriate use of resources based on changing crime trends and conditions The Compstat meetings that help to get things done in a timely manner</p>	<p>Tendency to follow routine procedures for budgeting and resource allocation instead of allocating resources on an as needed basis</p>

4. Discussion

The current form of Compstat in the NPD was highly structured. In line with the recent movement toward performance-based police management, Compstat in the NPD relied on targeted goals and objectives that went beyond retrospective analysis and record keeping. Not surprisingly, the main goal was to reduce crime, which was regularly compared to the same time period in the previous years. Commanders always competed with the figures from the previous year and with other commanders. In that sense, clearly defined organizational goals, strategies, and missions were linked with the measures, which had been translated into tangible indicators. These measures were monitored regularly in the Compstat meetings.

There were a core set of management principles built around comprehensive crime analysis techniques and coordinated and collaborative problem-solving (Dabney, 2010). A culture of information sharing and accountability guided the short and long term planning and operations of the NPD. The meetings, with their well defined rules and practices, provided a basis for information sharing, accountability, and assessment of the overall success of the plans in fulfilling the goals. Thus, the overall purpose of Compstat in the NPD resembles a strategic planning system in which organizations define their priorities, missions, and directions and translate them into clear plans that will be measured by standard measures, and evaluated and followed up with through accountability. In this system, all precinct commanders were aware that they were held accountable for the results that they obtained and the problem solving strategies that they adopted. Therefore, regular Compstat meetings established a measure of

performance, accountability for goal achievement, and a sustainable process to ensure that the strategies have been carried out. These meetings also served as a way to assess which strategies work and which do not (Buntin, 1999).

In terms of the components of Compstat, it was evident that officers at all levels of the organization bought into the fundamental crime fighting mission of Compstat. Similarly, accountability was enhanced among mid-level officers. However, there was not any clearly defined system to hold front line officers accountable and reinforce accountability outside the meetings. These officers were given the role to follow orders without making them understand the mindset behind these orders.

The organization was clearly more sensitive and flexible in following emerging problems and responding to them by assigning personnel and resources in a timely manner. "Officers commented on and appreciated Compstat for its geographic command structure and emphasis on geographically driven and fluid in the deployment, which allowed for a less cumbersome and more prompt response to criminal activities" (Dabney, 2010: 43). The availability of data and regular presentation of it at Compstat meetings improved the speed and response to hot spots.

Turning to the issues of a data-driven approach, each unit became expert at compiling complex data that captured offending, arrest numbers, and many other figures. However, less progress was made in evaluating the meaning of this data and coming up with creative and innovative problem solving and police tactics. This data was not used to identify the underlying causes of crime problems and respond to them smartly and proactively. Rather, officers relied more on personal experience, anecdotal evidence, and traditional police tactics and strategies. Even if officers came up with innovative or wise plans and strategies in the meetings, "the spirit of these plans often got lost between the Compstat meeting and the front line officers, who thought as though there was no strategic vision guiding their daily activities" (Dabney, 2010: 49). In addition, the need to respond to crimes quickly undermined the need to pursue the most effective innovative strategies, and led to follow traditional tactics and strategies.

The Compstat was clearly very helpful in the improvement of the NPD. However, a close scrutiny of the practices shows that there is room for improvement. There are certain points to be improved in accountability and information sharing. The level of innovation and creativity is more problematic than accountability and information sharing. Clearly, NPD is concerned more with hierarchy, formality, rules, procedures, and punishment in the form of humiliation. The sense of fear and the control function is more dominant than flexibility. There is a common understanding described as '*you never win in Compstat*'. Within this cultural environment, it is hard to expect creativity or innovative information sharing. By referring to these points, some officers suggested organizing the meeting differently in terms of number and communication design. "*Instead of saying, second precinct what you are doing about your robberies. It can be something like let's talk about robberies now?*" So, the meeting becomes more problem driven instead of being personnel driven. Another officer explained the need to accept all ideas as valuable ones which may generate an idea for a good strategy.

Another problem in Compstat is the ignorance of problems that are beyond the control of officers. While Compstat reinforces a '*can do*' mentality and increases accountability and responsibility of officers, it is necessary to consider possibility of social, economic, or other problems in the increase of crime rates. In some cases, the upper echelon ignored the larger problems by holding officers responsible for any increase of crime rates. This might be disappointing for officers who try to influence crime even though they don't have the capacity to do so. This point should be considered in order to avoid officer burn out as a result of questioning for any increase in crime rates or emerging problems. In this sense, organizational members should be evaluated for things that are in their capacity.

Conclusion

Society's rapidly changing conditions and needs, demographics, market demands, government regulations, pressures created by globalization, increasing competition and resource constraints, and technological developments coalesce to make change a critical issue for all types of organizations. Compstat is one of these change initiatives that has been adopted by numerous organizations in the last two decades to address the emerging challenges and opportunities.

For this reason, this study analyzed the principles and components of this model in a specific police organization. It focused on both contributions and limitations of this model, perspective of officers from different levels, and reflections on the practice. This perspective is more informative for the practitioners who are planning to adapt this kind of models in their organizations. It is hoped that a thorough understanding of Compstat in this study will be quite significant in obtaining a realistic assessment of implementing this kind of planned change initiatives and learning how to deal effectively with them.

This model has a high potential to address some of these operational and managerial problems of the Turkish National Police (TNP). This study shed light on the story of Compstat in the NYPD, but it can be certainly adapted to the Turkish National Police. However, there are potential difficulties for the implementation of this model in Turkey in terms of the differences between the USA and Turkey in the police structure, culture, technological infrastructure, and policing approaches. Only after we take into account these difficulties and assess carefully the modifications needed in the Compstat model and TNP, it is more likely to help us to overcome the problems of the TNP. For this reason, future research should make a comparison of Turkey and USA in terms of their structure, culture, technological infrastructure, and policing approaches and provide a perspective for practitioners who are willing to adapt this kind of models.

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