



Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi

The Journal of International Social Research

Cilt: 8 Sayı: 36 Volume: 8 Issue: 36

Şubat 2015 February 2015

www.sosyalarastirmalar.com Issn: 1307-9581

## A RETROSPECT TO GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPE: HAS GERMANY EVER PROVED TO BE KANTIAN?

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### Abstract

This paper is set out to study whether Germany's European politics can be confined into Kantian (liberal) or Bismarckian (realism) realm and to what extent these two traditions can shed light on the current policy of Germany within European Union. The clash of idealism and realpolitik are going to be used as a means to shed light on Germany's current hegemony in the EU. It is also aimed to point out how permanent emphasis on national interest is prevailing in Adenauer's period and how Bismarckian way of dealing with international relations still protects its validity today. It is argued that Germany's ongoing integration policy (Kantian perspective) is an incremental tool in service of recognition in the international arena in 50s and then paving the way for a renewed hegemony of Germany in the continent. It is a significant descriptive study since it points out how Kantian approach is utilized as a means to reach Bismarckian Germany since many scholars focus on the overlap of national interest and integration policies but not questioning whether German national interest is the prime beneficiary in the process even after the WWII.

**Keywords:** Hegemony, realism, liberalism, Germany, Bismarck, Adenauer, European Union.

### Introduction

Liberalism, focusing on the possibility of peace, individual liberties, seeking solution to war through collective action, placing law over war, is in constant dialogue with realism to which the inevitability of wars, power, national interest and balance of power are central. This paper is set out to examine the two trends, liberalism and realism in German politics and how these two trends can put light on the current German politics and goals in European Union and to what extent current hegemonic status of Germany can be explained through these approaches. These two approaches are going to put light on the German tradition of politics, Germans' perspectives on Europe and their definitions of national interest. The clash of idealism and realpolitik are going to be used as a means to shed light on Germany's current hegemony in the EU. It is also aimed to point out how permanent emphasis on national interest is prevailing in Adenauer's period and how Bismarckian way of dealing with international relations still protects its validity today. It is argued that Germany's ongoing integration policy (Kantian perspective) is an incremental tool in service of recognition in the international arena in 50s and then paving the way for a renewed hegemony of Germany in the continent. It is a significant descriptive study since it points out how Kantian approach is utilized as a means to reach Bismarckian Germany since many scholars focus on the overlap of national interest and integration policies but not questioning whether German national interest is the prime beneficiary in the process even after the WWII. This paper argues that integration would not be realized if it were not for enhancing the capacities of nation-state, Germany. It firstly deciphers the aspects of realism prevalent in Bismarckian Germany and liberalism in Kantian approach

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then focuses on the question whether solemn Kantian reading of Adenauer's period is explanatory enough, and to what extent both of these traditions are explanatory for current German hegemonic status in the EU. It aims to put question marks on the point that the integration policies of Germany can only be explained through Kantian perspective. It also points out that the blood and iron rhetoric as a way to sustain hegemony was replaced with economic instruments such as trade, tourism, economic parameters and financial instruments. The attractiveness of the Germany's superior position to other EU members, is also a sign of the hegemonic structure of the relationship. The attractiveness of Germany's economic prosperity and spill-over effect is under scrutiny in terms of increasing state capacities. With this aspect, Greece in debt and financial crisis, failure of the welfare state, Germany's viable response on behalf of the continual functioning of the system (financial aid to Greece economy), are going to be scrutinized in view of protection and development of German national interests, since it cannot be explained solemnly via pro-integrationist arguments.

### **1.1. Otto Von Bismarck Period (1815-1898): Realism in European and Domestic Politics**

Blood and iron, according to Bismarck, was the key words to determine the fate of his time, not flourished speeches or democratically taken decision. The speech of Bismarck was made for the defense of the army and the monarch in the parliament dominated by the liberals (Evans 2011, 37). In the meantime, Bismarck, a prominent leader with the might to change the map of Europe in nine years, became the architect of the unified Germany. Bismarck believed in the power of struggle as he claims that readiness (*para bellum*) for war is prevailing, there is no life without struggle and for the continuity of life, struggle is a requirement (Taylor 1955, 203). Throughout his period one can get a grasp of his "emphasis on the state as power" (Steeffel 1930, 77). Struggle which is the keyword explaining his independent feature throughout his life, serves for building up a circle of security, independence and material interest which is reflected in his foreign policy and his words: it is the material interests that govern the time we live in (Gitermann 1923, 77). It is the rule of a state that forces him towards the material interests and his political action did not serve for the nationality, "but it was the reality of *state*" (Karsten 1908, 100). Being minister of foreign affairs in Prussia, Bismarck's talent of diplomacy points out his rather "rational, balanced and conciliatory ways" in foreign affairs, however Bismarck's long handling with external affairs and diplomacy with other European states did not exclude him from "a contradiction in his position", since he advocated the use of force as the ultimate option but also talking about dying for the ultimate aim (Evans 2011, 37). Bismarck believed that war can be inevitable when the benefit of the state is at stake, which emphasizes the selfishness of the anarchical state system.

Bismarck's actions and views on Europe were also directed towards achieving the domestic aims and the idea of organized state. Bismarck making use of the foreign affairs in order to restore the internal balance, points out that he saw the reciprocal and mutual influences between domestic and foreign affairs. Bismarck's foreign policy and speeches declaring his and German Empire's stance in Europe serve for the aim of consolidating and polishing the national sentiments which is of significance providing continuity in domestic support and gave him a strong hand while playing his cards in foreign affairs. Bismarck makes use of a self-esteemed rhetoric via "if we should be attacked from two sides at once, we could have a million good soldiers, and a million reservists in the interior to send forward where needed" which is of significance in two respects (Fuller 1922, 314). On the one hand he succeeds in his project of forming a German nationalism and polishing nationalist notions inside his Empire, it also functions to depict German Empire as a ready force to have a 'preventive war' or as a power providing the balance in European state system.

### **1.2. Realism in Bismarckian Germany: Balance of Power and State Capacities**

Bismarck knew how to play the role of balancing power in European territorial disputes. Though he was also included in a controversial annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, what he envisaged of the annexation was based upon the "grounds of security" (Evans 2011, 38).

Bismarck extracted the aims of other European states, such as Austria and Russia and made use of their clashing territorial interests upon Balkans, which was helpful in his engagement with Austria against "Tsarist government collision course with Central Germanic Europe" (Evans 2011, 38). On the hand, he claimed that "in the long run, we cannot co-exist together", he did not hesitate to form a 'Dual Alliance' with Austria even after a victorious war result, in line with his view of balance-role in Europe and supporting his view with the words; "Alliance with an autocrat, a half barbarian and very disturbed nation, constitutes a risk, while one with a weaker state like Austria offers plenty of advantages" (Evans 2011, 38).

In European affairs, as a typical premise of realism, Bismarckian Germany benefited from the balance of power politics making use of the strategic principle 'enemy of my enemy is my friend' for the advantages yielded from this policy-making style would yield the consolidation of security for Germany. Bismarck's memoirs reveal more of his perspective on Europe. The general climate governing the views of Germans were shaped by the utter hatred "for Russia and England: wholesome respect mingled with fear, but not with love" (Usher 1915, 48). For instance, Bismarck's view that "Russia's international value depends on a single pair of eyes, in other words, upon the Tsar's himself" molded the way German diplomats were engaging the issues when the case involved Russia (Usher 1915, 56). It was the general view of Germans during the 19th century that Russia's fate should be restricted to the geographical boundaries of Asia, which is of significance when Russia formed a pact with France, it was Austria (the enemy of German Empire's enemy) which was firmly bound to Germany. Bismarck's view of Italy's assistance was also vital due to its geo-political situation against a probable conflict with France. Peace and stability in Europe was based upon the consolidated German Empire which is of significance in order to provide a balance among European alliances, since Germany could play a deterrent role as long as it is in compliance with the concept of an ever preparedness for war (Fuller 1922, 306). Though it also includes the risk of self-fulfilling prophecy, *para bellum* is a contingent aspect of nation state paradigm based on the protection of fixed borders, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Through the diplomatic genius of the Chancellor and his manipulation of other European powers, Bismarckian empire turned out to be the hegemonic power of Europe though it did not involve in use of hard coercive power (Andrews 1965, 350).

It does not take a genius to deduce from Bismarck's speeches that he puts emphasis on the central role of German Empire, on the one hand, the agent preventing Russia from intervening into the heart of the Europe, or from creation of a Europe of Anglo-Franc hegemony and formed multi-alliances to deter German hostilities by placing them into a position that would be out of the balance (Kiss 1998, 77). That is why he is perceived "as a master of balance and moderation" (Stürmer 1971, 294). He created a milieu of trust in the international politics, thanks to "his gifts being diplomacy of highest order, and moderation" (Hassel 1964, 292). Though the 19th century was the last peak era of empires, Bismarck's view of public opinion shaped by the media (press) was of significance when he stated in his speech of February 6, 1888,

Against the utterances of the Russian press, I have the direct testimony of the Emperor Alexander himself, given when I had the honor...of an audience with him a few months ago. I was then amply reassured that the Emperor of Russia entertains no hostility toward us and has no intention of attacking us (Fuller 1922, 311).

These words, summarizing the aspects of Bismarck's foreign policy, point out that though it was the time of Empires and Emperors, Bismarck pays attention to the Russians' view of Germany and feels the need to assure that 'the one pair of eyes' of Russia is not in the same line with what the media depicts of Germany. It is also evident that Bismarck was aware that public opinion becomes more and more decisive in giving shape to the way the events take shape. It can be argued that that's why he does not draw a strong line between the domestic and foreign issues but rather tend to put them in the same draw, the former affecting the latter or vice versa. Bismarck's realism and placing Germany as the heart of Europe, plays a crucial

role in his foreign policy designed to derive benefit from the peace as long as it lies in his power. As long as the benefits yielded from the milieu of truce were secured in stability, he asserted with precise words that “there is no need of fresh military glory, nor does she require new conquests” (Darmstaedter 1945, 69). The chancellor’s project of peace was maintained upon “the system of great European alliances, a remarkable arrangement of international checks and balances...” (Darmstaedter 1945, 71). Bismarck stood far from the point where Hitler stood, since he never envisaged a Germany in Moscow or St. Petersburg and the brutal capture of Alsace and Lorraine was not a result of nationalistic sentiments or desire for glory but a well-calculated policy for united Germany, security and balance of power that could only be explained through realist approach (Stürmer 1971, 302). National interest, power and glory were the prominent values in his policy-making, however he never valued glory when it was at the expense of national interest and Bismarck was a successful figure in stopping when it is the case. When there is a direct threat to German national interest, he did not hesitate to use the state power to eliminate it. When Napoleon intervened into Luxemburg and Rhine, Bismarck’s Germany waged war against France, and it was emancipated from its tyrannical rule (Karsten 1908, 93).

Bismarck manipulated the project of peace in the way that it should be maintained as long as the benefits are secured and it has nothing to do with the idea of Eternal Peace, but being prepared (*para bellum*) for the war in case the benefits are in jeopardy. Bismarckian Empire did not hesitate to place itself into a neutral position among dual hostilities and alliances since it yielded best to the interest and power of the state (Andrews 1965, 350). Bismarck was certainly aware of Kant’s philosophy of Eternal Peace (Perpetual Peace) however the former was a man of practice, the latter characterized as a man of theory. It was evident that ‘rule of law’ principle was not valid in securing national interests in the domestic and foreign sphere since the power plays of European powers were not based upon a communality for the rule of law or democratic institutions. Realpolitik in Bismarck’s Germany can be characterized with the concepts of independence and material interests, Machiavellian notion of dying for the benefits of the state and the ultimate goal, balance of power which is consolidated through “*para bellum*” among dual hostilities or different kinds of alliances, dominance, hegemonic power, placing Germany at the heart of Europe and exploiting history of emotions to consolidate the state power.

### **2.1. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Kant’s Perpetual Peace Theory and Implications for Today’s European and World Politics**

Immanuel Kant’s view of Europe cannot be evaluated without taking a whole appreciation of his work called *‘Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’* proposing replacement of Hobbesian state relations with a novel structure of “cosmopolitan law” and a kind of pacific union among the nations of the world (Bohman 1997, 1). The term ‘state of nature’ seems to be an allusion to what Rousseau proclaimed for the innateness of people and states in a perpetual conflict, struggle and strife in order to be the one who survives. Kant makes use of the reason as the prominent function to guide state and people’s actions towards perpetual peace, and “reason condemns war” is the summary of his thoughts which is of significance for the further detailed notions of Kantian Approach and Democratic Peace which aims to reach perpetual peace as an “immediate duty” (Bohman 1997,1). Realpolitik is only a means to decay in which Hobbesian nature of states create constant conflicts. Kant makes it clear that war is only a tool of devastation, and just a production of nation-state. His view on Europe was based upon the necessity to create a global community that can transcend nation-state. Kant’s view of Europe makes emphasis on the lack of overarching authority (absence of world state) over the states to protect the individual liberties and rights. War and conflict over the interests signifies the sentiment of rage which is of significance to my argument that Kant’s stoic view of the world is in total contrast. Stoicism offers a world governed by reason rather than the sentiments. It is the association of war with sentiments that makes Kant make use of reason as the prominent factor to condemn war. Bohman makes it clear that in accordance with Kant’s lines, “the moral advancement of humanity has only one anchor: whether or not humanity will solve the question of war and enter a phase of universal community of all

peoples governed by the rule of law or it" (Bohman 1997, 1). Otherwise there is a possibility that the new but old wars, interests and conflicts will emerge on the stage and dispose of the guidance of reason and a new but old way of solving problems would go on.

Bismarck's view of balance of power was only a means of sustaining the old hostilities, suspension of hostilities and securing the status-quo of European state system based upon the territorial and colonial race and Kant makes use of the term "pure illusion" for the ones who think that balance of power is the way right into the peace. What Kant proposes is an "eternal peace treaty", "including all peoples in a universal, cosmopolitan peace" and attributes it "not to the princes and rulers of Europe but to a public of all enlightened citizens of the world who see the necessity of establishing genuine peace" (Bohman 1997, 2). Kant perceived the solution of the problem through bottom-up means, rather top-down, which points out the democratic feature of his argument. He perceived 'demos' as the prominent factor in moving towards democratic institutions and eternal peace in European state system. In the century when the empires were in constant conflict with the newly rising nation-states, Kant endeavors to schedule a political system that secures the freedom of individuals "at every level of interaction" (Ellis 2005, 13).

Though Kant has a cosmopolitan way of looking at the solution of the problem and claiming cosmopolitan world republic as a solution to the conflicts, he further stresses that the kind of pacific union among democratic nations, each respecting fundamental human rights and founds a milieu in which people can exercise freedom on the basis of equal citizenship concept (Bohman 1997, 3). What Kant proposes is a universal and mutual respect for the human rights through which "the humanity not treated as a means but an end" (Bohman 1997, 3). That is what European state system lacked till the end of World War II when the human beings were only the means for the end (Danilovic 2007, 401). Kant's view of Europe and world politics in general, points out his prospects for the 20th and 21st centuries. "The cosmopolitan law" proposed by Kant was a precise prospect to today's international and even supranational institutions and formations such as United Nations and European Union. Regardless of its efficiency and permanent members' hegemony on the UN decision taking mechanisms, the purpose of cosmopolitan law and the purposes of UN are in the same line with what Kant proclaimed in the issues of peace-provision and prevention of wars and protection of human rights "unifying the human community at a global level beyond the current nation-state" (Bohman 1997, 6). However the ongoing debate between realism and liberal institutionalism gave birth to the concept of limitations of international law since nation-states are in constant endeavor to protect its national interest whenever the compliance puts them under hazard. It is also evident that through the process of newly arising globalization, economic interdependence between the nation-states and the purpose of peace, Europeans made use of this interdependence in order to create an economic and then political union though it is not a supranational union, many scholars accept the EU as a Kantian dream prevailing in the continent where the universal laws are binding (Bressand 2011, 62). However, in 2005, in France we witnessed the rebellion of French citizens with African origin (generally living in suburbs or ghettos) against the system since they did not feel themselves as the first class citizens but rather as the ones pushed out of the system, categorized the "others". Another instance witnessed was the Street Events in 2011 in London, UK, when people filled the streets in order to protest loudly that the economic system prevalent in UK has not given a viable response to the needs they have, it was only through the street protests that they could speak their claims louder than before. It is evident that even the core members of the EU do not comply with "universal laws" due to the nation-state paradigm functioning as Democles' sword over the member states.

Solution for the absence of world state is small federalist unions where some states keeping their sovereignty intact but adopting non-violence, through which a kind of pacific union is established where no wars can happen. States binding themselves through non-aggression pacts would widen through the admission of other states, creating a milieu of perpetual peace "civil liberties and the rule of law, separation of powers, and representative

governance" (Danilovic 2007, 397). As mentioned above, Kant's view of international relations starts from the states itself, bottom to top. At the domestic level, Kant envisages a state with a system of representative constitution with separation of powers. Through the domestic institutions, the rule that can easily be transformed into tyrannical power is constrained within the liberal democratic milieu in which "concern is that the representative character of legislative governance is not tainted by particular interests of the executive" (Cavallar 1999, 20; Rosen 1993, 33; Williams 1983, 171). Such that it provides "legal equality of individuals" namely ruled and the rulers (Ellis 2005, 13). It is also stated by Boham (1997) that "only the new institutions and political associations can hope to put an end to all hostilities"(12). In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant (1797) envisages "states not only to experience domestic peace, but international peace as well"(1996). There is also an interesting parallelism between what Kant proposed firstly, and what was aimed by UN firstly. Kant's world republic notion evolved into a more flexible system of nation states regulated by a supranational rule of law. UN founded as the legitimate institution for the prevention of war and maintenance of peace evolved into a loose form. The reason it evolved into a loose form was the result of the resistance of nation-states.

Today every inch of distancing from the rule of law creates another distance from what Kant proposed as a way to achieve perpetual peace. We come up with the fact that fundamental values of equality, human dignity and human rights are sacrificed for the sake of imperialistic or nationalistic desires resulting in hatred rather than what the book of love presented (Boham 1997, 32). Kant's view of Europe and the alliances formed in the continent as an illusion to provide peace was based upon the fact that Westphalian state system based upon the self-interest of modern nation-states gave birth to a nation-state formation 'norms' thrashing the diversity and ethnic cleansing issues in the name of establishing cultural uniformity in nation-state. It was evident that such a system would only suspend the hostilities and would postpone the tensions to be erupted in a larger scale. The modern state-system is based upon the selfish interests of the states upon which they give shape to their external actions even leading to military action.

Kant's view of Europe and state-system can also be contrasted with the way Bismarck engaged in the foreign policy formation of Germany. The notion of "para bellum" which was of crucial cornerstone in unfolding Bismarck's view of peace is totally rejected by Kant which can be evidenced by Kant's (1798) words in *Conflict of the Faculties*, "republican constitution created in such way as to avoid principles permitting offensive war"(1979, 153). It is evident that Kant's argument of love of peace is devoid of preparation for war. Since Bismarck was a man of action as a leader of the state, it was evident that policy-makers' tendency to make use of terms such as "peace" to serve their secret agenda was a prominent aspect which the modern state system inevitably gave birth to. Kant's arguments also reflect the tension between being a theoretician and action. Kant's theory is in service of the world community based on "separate peace between liberal states" while Bismarck's views of Germany and Europe were much more minimalist and legitimizing itself by working towards a cause (German state) (Doyle 1983, 230). Significant to my argument is the point that Kantian Approach is in total contrast with the idea of autocratic states which make use of state-mechanisms of hegemony over its citizens as mere machines and tools in the hands of the state which is in total contrast of what Kant proposed as the common human rights in provision of world citizenship. Guidance of reason for people and states (the way of disposing of sentiments and a sign of Kant's stoicism), legal rights and the world republic are the terms emerged in the era of modern state system where the self-interest of the states overwhelm what the reason paves the way for. Kant's views of perpetual peace and his proposals of supranational international law above the nation-states' competence are reflected today through the mechanisms of United Nations and growing economic-interdependence. It is also evident that Kantian thought will find its reflections on the current place of Germany within European Union politics since "the Kantian agenda remains the indispensable moral compass for a journey that Europe knows to be measured in centuries" however the moral compass mentioned above has never been a part of the nation-state paradigm (Bressand 2011,84). Kant's philosophy and views on the European state system

created “a generation conscientious servants of the Bureacratic State” whose pioneer was Konrad Adenauer who made use of Kantian ideals of cooperation, the rule of law, democratic governance in the domestic realm as a tool to get international recognition (Abbe 1953, 70).

### **3.1. Integration for the Sake of Recognition: Kantian Germany for Acknowledgement in the International Arena: Konrad Hermann Josef Adenauer (1876-1967)**

*“The humiliation of defeat teaches man better than the vanity of victory how to resurrect and inspire their own dear country”* (Annan 1982, 111)

There were simply two fundamental reasons for the EU: the first one was the WWI and the second one was WWII. Many scholars tend to associate Adenauer’s period as the emergence of Kantian Germany. Though Kant’s perspective on Europe shed light on the Adenauer’s policies to be discussed below, the ultimate aim seems to be more of national interest rather than a pure loyalty to international institutions. The milieu Adenauer came to power was based upon the military government whose members were living in an imaginary world in which they thought that Germany could exist without any cooperation in “a political vacuum”(Annan 1982, 97). Germany’s social and economic situation can be summarized by making reference to his words of “9000000 refugees to be taken, losses of territories before Hitler’s annexations, loss of Eastern Germany whose food supply and lands were of vital significance”(Adenauer 363, 1953). He was able to read European affairs starting to signal a new phase in economic, social and political engagements where the nation-states will be ‘much closer than ever’ where struggle in a vacuum is not possible. One can easily find the echoes of what Kant proposed as the recipients of his political philosophy of ‘perpetual peace’ in the supranational institutions. Adenauer claims the problems of his time as “the effective realization of democratic principles within a constitutional order and international associations for the preservation of peace and justice” (Adenauer 1952, 156). In reference to the debate of European Germany and the German Europe of which British politicians had memories, it is clear that Adenauer put the values of the novel Germany on the stage “which so many Englishmen for a century had admired” (Annan 1982, 99). Though he was authoritarian and patient in character, he believed in the democratic institutions and values whose realization was “vital for German democracy if every individual shares fully in their spiritual and material benefits” (Adenauer 1952, 157).

Adenauer was also aware of the socio-psychological heritage remained as a ramshackle of Hitler’s Germany and camps and he actually makes a reference to that heritage which is the prominent issue since it was not possible to Europeanize the Germany without Europeanizing German people’s psychology/public opinion. Konrad Adenauer’s primary agenda was consisted of “tackling the German question” which calls for erasing Bismarck’s and Hitler’s heritage of bloodshed and projects of “German Europe” in Thomas Mann’s words, “therefore amounted to allaying French security concerns about Germany’s economic recovery” (Dinan 2004, 29). The issue of dealing with the German question requires rebuilding a concrete sense of credibility on the part of Western Germany which could only be achieved with a political figure whose “anti-Nazi credentials” are obvious (Dinan 2004, 29).

It is the combination of international endeavors (Schuman Declaration, Marshall plan and Jean Monnet initiative) and German decision-makers’ and demos’ irreversible willingness to engage Germany’s economy and policies in the international system which molded Adenauer’s view and implementations in German foreign and domestic policies. There is an undeniable overlap between Adenauer’s view of future Germany and Schuman declaration project on the point that the plan includes tackling the German problem (implicit equality and nondiscrimination in the context of European state system), a specific solution to the problem the Ruhr as a supranational organization to pool coal and steel (Dinan 2004, 37). Adenauer’s embracement of Schuman Declaration and Monnet Plan also signifies a domestic political challenge to the ones criticizing him “for being subservient to the former occupying power” by building a sense of credibility which has been non-existent for a century (Dinan 2004, 41). It is evident that European integration was “a means of overcoming Germany’s disastrous traditions

and atavistic nationalism" and thus obtaining international recognition (Schwarz, Schneider 1994, 83).

Dinan makes reference to Adenauer's words making his point about the project in his mind with the words of "the stronger the Federal Republic of Germany becomes, economically and politically, the better it will be for Berlin and the German east" (Dinan 2004, 40). Adenauer's plan was built upon engagement of Germany into the West, thus with "great sensitivity to U.S. and French opinion" for which "the Schuman Plan remained an essential building block of Germany's policy of rapprochement with France and full integration in the West" (Dinan 2004, 50). It is also an allusive fact that Adenauer's foreign and domestic policies are completing each other, and actually an embodiment of the situation which can be called one within the other. Taking regard of his project of "German remilitarization proposed as less political, than a strategic one" in case of "an invasion by the Red Army in East Germany" which is a tangle and delicate political decision due to its implications that can be sparkled in French politicians' minds (Dinan 2004, 58). He was also sensitive in his view of Russian zone and Russia and even from the very beginning of his political life, he referred to Russian zone as lost - and maybe giving the clue that the main focus of his policy was the betterment of Western Germany (Annan 1982, 97). In Adenauer's view, "the task of uniting Germany was the noblest task of the Federal Republic" however could only be achieved through freedom and peace in Western Germany, whose existence would create a "stronger Federal Republic" (Adenauer 1952, 160). In parallel with the Kantian approach, the democratic institutions in the domestic arena were achieved by "parliamentary democracy and social market economy" (Kiss 1998, 79).

Adenauer's being excessively deferential to French feelings fore-grounded in the problem solution processes of Saar issue, and economic cooperation. During such a process, both of the sides adopted the delicate policy of taking one step back in one issue and another step further in another issue, which is of significance for the continuation of the process of the engagement in 'the heart of Europe'. After two world wars and 'a long 19th century', European continent was on the verge of opening up a new stage of re-construction where international institutions, interdependence between national economies and the adjustment of markets and social policies are more than a necessity (Dinan 2004, 69). ECSC and EC were not only keys to improve economic interdependence and cooperation but also political instruments to erase the history of emotions reminiscent of World War II period. The process handled by Adenauer can be argued as a tool to obtain legitimacy in terms of political recognition and be treated as an equal state in the international arena (Lemke 2010, 507). Just like Bismarckian Germany, Adenauer also did use "enemy of my enemy is my friend" notion taking regard of the fact that Eastern Germany is under Soviet domination and it was the US interest in Germany that should have been kept constant. It is fair to argue that Adenauer it was the use of balance of power politics which paved the way for democratization of Western Germany via the effect of Western Alliance.

Adenauer also made use of non-European problems as in the case of Suez affair. When "Adenauer wholeheartedly supported the French intervention" which was not only a support to France, but also a part of the integration of Europe since rejection of French politics in Suez affairs had more costs than benefits in the long run taking regard of the needed Franco-German leadership to begin the economic integration process. This kind of stepping back would play a crucial point for Adenauer and Mollet meetings where "Franco-German hegemony" will be fore-grounded in ECSC and 'the six' to create European economic integration (Dinan 2004, 72). Thus, relative calculation for the short term costs of Suez affair and long term benefits of economic integration is the core of the policy to be adapted since Germany chose the latter one which depicts the realpolitik aspect. The Franco-German partnership, in Adenauer's words, is "the foundation for the edifice of European Unification" thus it is not an embodiment of hegemony, but rather a partnership working for the benefit of all Europe and the world politics but re-placing Germany at the heart of the project to Unification (Adenauer 1962, 60). Dinan (2004) makes reference to Elysee Treaty signed between De Gaulle and Adenauer as a signifier of "Franco-German friendship in accord with both Germany's and America's post-war



European policies" (103). It is of significance since it foreshadows "the closer ties between France and Germany, historically the engine of post-war unity" (Dinan 2004, 103). It is of significance to note down that while unfolding his views on Europe, it does not take a genius to trace the parallelism between domestic and foreign policies implemented. His support to France in Suez affair was an instrument to indicate his willingness to forge the unity, a unity which will end up with economic-interdependence, welfare, employment which will compensate for the losses of the last century and re-construct the Germany as a living state. In his view, "soldiers and arms do not suffice to provide security" (Adenauer 1952, 158). In his speech at Chatham House in England, he makes use of the words, 'production', 'employment', 'rubbles being carted away' and 'democracy' indicating his will to restore Germany from within and without at the same time. Adenauer refers to "exaggerated nationalism" as the catalyst of the catastrophes in Europe, whose synecdoche was "by legislation to transfer sovereign powers to international institutions and to consent to limitations upon its sovereign powers apt to bring about a peaceful and lasting order in Europe" since lasting order in Europe would benefit the Germany primarily (Adenauer 1952, 159).

Adenauer was aware that the Europeanization German minds would benefit Germany in the long run, and that's why he envisaged the young people of Germany working for the continent and creating a better perspective on the other states and people which would pave the way for cooperation and make Germany an emerging hub (Adenauer 1952, 161). He also makes reference to the European Coal and Steel Community and European Defense Community underlining the point that these treaties "remove the danger of hostilities breaking out between contracting parties" (Adenauer 1952, 159). Another reference made to Churchill's famous Zurich Speech, which is of great significance since it calls for rebuilding a new Europe where the old blood-shed and the alliance of armies are represented as the memories to be buried in the past. Adenauer's commitment to engage Germany into the international and especially newly arising European economic system and his project of "partnership of the Federal Republic in the European Community" functions as a signifier of equality between European states and Germany and a way of re-tracking its economic, ("devotion of every dollar of American funding to war reparations") social ("labor market measures and the endeavors to solve the problems of refugees and expellees who cannot be absorbed in the industry") and socio-psychological ("repairing the damage done to Jews") means (Adenauer 1952, 160-161). Adenauer policy of commitment to the European Defense community and ECSC was a means of, in his view, a deterrent force against Soviet Union. It is a delicate policy-making and obviously calculated in detail since Adenauer was well aware of the fact that if European integration project failed, American support and interest to/in Europe would decrease. Each policy-maker was aware that it was American interest in Europe that functions as a deterrent factor against Soviet Union, preventing it from taking drastic actions.

Adenauer underlined the fact that Germany was situated at the core of Europe, whose commitment and permanent existence in the European system is not less than of vitality. He also explicitly made it clear that the Germans are prepared to be in service of prevalence of peace in the Uniter States of Europe pointing out that German people pay off what American and other European countries paved the way for them (Adenauer 1955, 183). Adenauer steps forward as the one whose credentials were molded by what the Kantian approach calls for first steps. He was successful in his commitment to engage Germany into European system, in a continent where two world wars broke out. He opened the way for the idea that it does not suffice to have huge armies like that of Hitler or Bismarck to provide a European habitus of security. It is through economic and political interdependence, where the power of negotiation and to talk foregrounds, in which the goal of peace and security and then political recognition can be obtained. Through Adenauer's Kantian approach to European politics, it would not be a complete claim to argue that Germany followed the way paved by Kant beforehand. Kantian perspective adopted by Adenauer was also a means to get rid of historical pressures and gaining legitimacy in the international area and preparing for a new period where Germany will be the heart (engine) of Europe. Adenauer derived benefits from peace since it paved the

way for international recognition which served the national interest. Adenauer's European politics was not devoid of balance of power politics since very similar to Bismarckian Empire adopting independent position between the super powers of his time, Adenauer made use of US interest in Europe as a way to deter Soviet desires into Europe. Thus it cannot be argued that his European politics were a pure reflection of Kantian approach in practice.

#### **4.1. Current German Politics: Integration for the Sake of Expanding State Capacities?**

It is fair to claim that Germany of Adenauer and in the last ten years, cannot be evaluated as exempt from the sphere of realism or through a pure attribution to Kantian view of international relations, since one needs to refer to state as power, hegemony, relative material interests and gains, rational, balanced and well calculated ways and benefits of the state as will be argued below. Before involving in the discussion below, it is worth noting down that the hegemonic power obtained via non coercive means does not have any ground in Kantian approach.

National sovereignty and the EU integration seem to be mutually exclusive, since integration (at least by definition) means a loss of national-sovereignty, namely a transfer of national sovereignty to an international institution. For instance; almost none of the member states favor a European Union which has the capacity to put tax on the EU citizens. However, there has always been a fear of Germany, standing at the heart of Europe and during 60s and 70s, British and French counterparts opposed German wishes for a federal Europe, due to the fear that a deepened and integrated Europe would be controlled by Germany (Walker 2002, 34). Integration and deepening policies of the EU, do not necessarily mean a loss or transfer of one part of sovereignty but rather a means of empowering a further dominance for Germany. Thomas Mann favored "a Europeanized Germany, rather than a German Europe". But what is to be argued for today's Germany is that it is not into integration just for the sake of integration but for the national interest. To the extent that integration is of beneficial aspects to its national-interest, Germany's responsiveness towards integration scales up. The balance between the national-interest and international responsibilities is of a biased nature. When one takes regard of the German autonomy or hegemony as the literature proposes, it is "not a traditional hegemony but 'a soft hegemony' " that can be observed in today's Germany and its place in the EU (Kiss 1998, 85). The soft hegemony is exempt from use of hard-power, but a soft power, and also a kind of hegemony created through interdependence in economic terms but today's Germany does whatever Bismarckian Germany would do without use of hard power.

Though it is not through "blood and iron", it is through "capital and financial means" that Germany is successful in achieving or securing a dominant position. During Greek debt crisis in 2010, it was evident that Greece was on the verge of being a sample for failed welfare state. Many economists feared the spillover effect of the crisis which would be seen in Spain, Portuguese and Italy respectively. Germany's role during 2010 economic crisis erupting in Spain, Portuguese and Greece and failure of welfare state shaped "a new role as a paymaster" (Bulmer, Paterson 1944,31). The fear about German hegemony in the EU, turned out to be something desired rather than feared. The German hegemonic power turned out to be in a direct relationship with the integrated markets of the EU. It was through the financial support given to Greece that European interests were secured, but more than that, Germany's national capacities are reformed. If one remembers Financial Times' headline in 2010, "Greece is for sale-cheap and Germany is buying", one can delve into the psychology of how the Germany's being "a paymaster" may have different meanings depending on where one stands. Though some scholars such as Bulmer and Paterson makes reference to Germany's loyalty to the EU mechanisms, the argument to be made here is; Germany did the best to prevent the failure of EU market, but more than that, its dominant position in the market.

When it comes to the Balkan countries and their integration policies, due to the cultural impact exercised on the states bound by eastern enlargement process; citizens living within the borders of these states have high degree of expectations to be fulfilled by Germany (Schwarz, Schneider 1994, 83). In parallel with the expectations, Germany signifies a power to prevent any

interventions into the development of democracies in Eastern Europe. German hegemony is also a guarantee for the developing democracies and their integration into the EU and European economy. The image of Germany is as such since Germany expanded its visibility in the public sphere and it is also tangible in the daily lives of Eastern Europeans, for instance: we witness the expansion of German banks and their financial transactions in Balkan countries (Overbeek 2012, 34). German interests cannot be constrained within the sovereign German territory, that is why, "favouring both widening and deepening are essential to German interests" (Janning 1996,40). Integration into international institutions, institutional platforms, multilateral regional agreements such as EU and NATO, can be viewed in perspective of state interest, a cover over the realism aspect of foreign policy making and defense of civil power replacing the use of hard power (Fischer 1994). It can be argued that there is a certain break with / rejection of historical heritage of Bismarckian and Hitler's Germany during Adenauer's period, however it does not mean that Germany's policies are in an utter compliance with Kantian perspective. When it comes to economic perspective, the soft hegemony means that a state increases its trade volume to the extent that lack of it is of high possibility to create an economic crisis. Germany is also a good example for such an instance since "in the years 1996-2008, Germany's export volume grew twice as fast as that of the rest of the euro-zone" (Overbeek 2012, 34). It means that if Germany lost soft-autonomous power in terms of economy and finance, catastrophic days would await the euro-zone. European politics is not only what is at hand, but also on the possibility of what if what is at hand is not at hand anymore. Germany as an economic engine of Europe is a value whose failure matters more than that of its possibility to adopt a hegemonic status for its European counterparts. As instanced above through the cases of Bismarckian Germany, it is evident that there were many tangible "attempts to bring about a united Europe through aggression, that is 'civil war', through hegemony, through supremacy of one over the other" (Knappstien 1963,75). Though Lemke maintaining Kantian eye-glasses in 2010s, claims that German insistence on the international institutions as an anchor for European politics rather than mere emphasis on national interest, what is argued fundamentally in this paper is that it is not necessarily the case (2010, 504). As can be instanced by German economic power growth and export-import volume, enhancing political effectiveness in terms of enlargement and deepening points out that Germany is based upon the international institutions as long as it benefits its national interest. For instance one needs to question whether German public-opinion would be appeased if they were not persuaded about the probable spillover effect of the debt and financial crisis. Lemke maintains that European policy of Germany is "shaped by the historically and culturally constructed frames of political choices and preferences rather than prescribed by national interest" (2010, 506). However, it is the argument in this paper that it is the culturally and historically constructed frames of national-interest that gives shape to political choices and preferences in terms of its premises for evaluating integration as subservient to national-interest, namely realism, in other words Bismarckian politics. The argument that Euro-polity is an essential part of the German political sphere is valid as long as the national-interest of Germany is not under jeopardy (Lemke 2010 507). Germany also endeavors to put the Euro-polity under its control and even thinking of "letting" Greece get out of the euro-zone if the new government to be elected does not comply with the economic program of restoration since it would mean the continuity of financial crisis that is of probability to be contagious for other EU members. Whenever the benefits of European integration overwhelm the costs, Germany is into it, thus Germany can be regarded as a hegemonic tamed power (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 688). Through the use of its political and economic power, the spillover effect on "military power, language, ideological and cultural factors" can also be observed (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 688). It is the "skillfully use" of "economic instruments and incentives" that provides achievement for German decision-makers in reaching to the foreign policy aims that would firstly serve the national interest (Ash 1994, 68).

Taking regard of the "trade flows" and net "budget contribution of Germany to EU budget", one can delve into the question to what extent Germany does fit into the term of soft-

hegemonic power (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 688). The kind of hegemony is not a type forcing, or in contrast to the interests of Germany's partners but actually the other EU member feeling the hegemonic power of Germany do not want to cut free of it since they also benefit from it (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 699). Trading-agreements, as the basic premise of the liberalism and globalism, cannot be constrained into the realm since the current trade agreements and the way they are arranged places Germany into a preliminary position in regard of benefits (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 700). Though it is a hypothetical question, one may ask the question whether Germany would be loyal to EU trade arrangements if it did not serve the national-interest and if it were not a prime beneficiary. Thus staying loyal to trade arrangements is not a diversion from realist/national interest paradigm, but a filling the arsenal of the national-interest as a hegemonic power. Germany seems to keep its beneficiary aspect out of such arrangements through its "discreet pursuit of national-interests" since there is a "habitual conflation of national and international interests" (Ash 1994, 71). Relatively small EU members' markets like Netherlands and Luxembourg are full of German products which points out "the growth of German market penetration" (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 688). It is such trade arrangements that made "Germany Europe's biggest exporting country" which is of a dominating aspect through which it enjoys a milieu in which national interests are polished (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 706).

Germany sending the most number of tourists abroad, with the escalating power of Bundesbank (its reports on the German economy, inflation forecasts, interest rate policies are followed by the other central banks), its capacity and zeal to undertake the costs of sustaining the European market when it is on the verge of crisis is of a European political sphere which serves the hegemony of it (Markovits, Reich, Westermann 1996, 712). Since the monetary policies adopted by the Bundesbank has a great deal of effect on the other central banks of EU member states, "Bundesbank, as if it were, is making foreign policy by not making foreign policy" (Ash 1994, 68). Though on the surface it seems as though it is an "habitual conflation of German and European interests", it is the conflation produced not due to solemn interest in international institutions but enhancing national capacity through international means, and that's how Germany now "seeks both the rights and duties of world power"(Ash 1994, 71). The last but not least, when the integration is constrained out of the milieu of national sovereignty, Germany makes best of its national capacities (Schwarz 1994).

### **Conclusion**

This paper fills out the gap between liberal and realist readings in view of German politics in the EU. It deciphers that even though German policy of the EU integration can be evaluated through Kantian eye-glasses, it does not necessarily mean that it is an utter Kantian project that finds its reflection on German politics. Though one may need to refer to Kantian approach and premises of liberalism in explaining the current German politics, it does not give a complete picture since Kantian view of Europe has been a tool for recognition and obtaining legitimacy and integration without damaging the national interests, which end up with a Germany who exercises hegemonic power whose absence is not desired even by the other trade partners who are relatively at loss. It is the material interests, pursue of benefits and relative benefit and cost calculation that govern the premises of German politics even at the times when the people were dreaming for United States of Europe. The terms associated with liberal notions such as cooperation, integration, rule of law, democratic institutions were means to substantiate the capacities and power of the state which is the solemn reality.

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