Author(s): Afife Şeyma TAÇ
Knowledge is principally examined through its classification into conception and assent in classical logic. In the process of this examination there are principles and objectives for both of these two parts. While the principles of conception are five universals with which the objective of conception, namely the definition, is accomplished; principles of belief are proposition and its states which lead us to the objective of assent, i.e. syllogism. Since a categorical proposition is consisted of t hree things, subject, predicate and nexus, it is a compound sentence which is susceptible to be claimed as either true or false and through this characterization other sentence types, such as imperative and question sentences, are excluded from the definition of proposition.In the process of acquisition of knowledge, definition stands at the very beginning due to the fact that without concepts it is not possible to formulate premises, let alone syllogism. Therefore it is necessary to take the conditions set for definition into account when formulating one. In this paper, our concern will be the condition asserting that there must be an equality in predication between the definiens and the definiendum. To examine this rule closely we will be focusing on Taftazani’s (d. 1390) criticism of his teacher, Kutbuddin Razi (d. 1365), who has written the most well known commentary on Shamsiyya. Having agreed with his teacher on the condition of equality between the definiens and the definiendum, Taftazani’s real concern is about the way in which Kutbuddin Razi justifies this rule
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